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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ increased reliance on targeted killings
has prompted no shortage of legal and moral criticisms. Critics
have focused on the two most well-known strikes: the Navy
1
Seal raid against bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad, Paki† Associate Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, jdo43@cornell.edu. I
received helpful suggestions during faculty workshops at Cornell, Columbia,
and Binghamton universities and the American Philosophical Association.
Copyright © 2013 by Jens David Ohlin.
1. See How U.S. Forces Killed Osama Bin Laden, CNN (May 3, 2011,
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stan, and the drone strike in Yemen that killed the leader of al2
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Anwar al-Awlaki. In
particular, political critics questioned the Obama administration’s decision to use lethal force. Why were the targets not arrested and placed on trial, either before a military commission
or a federal district court? Their deaths were ordered by executive branch officials and then personally confirmed by the president. To some, this smacked of an imperial presidency, unen3
cumbered by judicial restraint. While death by jury—capital
punishment—is still the law of the land in the United States,
death by executive fiat is presumably unconstitutional under
4
domestic law and illegal under international law.
When transposed in legal terms, the criticism implied that
the United States had a duty to capture bin Laden and alAwlaki, or at the very least had a duty to attempt capture before resorting to lethal force. Although this “duty to capture”
argument is essential to resolving the legality of targeted killings, the legal contours of this duty are often poorly understood, in part because the duty to capture depends entirely on
which body of law applies to the situation at hand.
For example, the U.S. constitutional norms that attach to
domestic criminal-law situations clearly entail a duty to at5
tempt capture. In cases of individual self-defense, a citizen
may only kill his or her attacker if a non-lethal means—say escape, retreat, or capture—is unavailable, impossible, or imprac6
ticable. Generally speaking, killings are justified as lawful
7
self-defense only if the action is, in a sense, unavoidable. In
practical terms, though, the capture requirement will rarely affect the analysis if the attacker is armed with a weapon. In
such situations, it is usually assumed that a private citizen
could not capture the attacker without unduly risking his own
life. If there is a trade-off to be made between protecting the life

11:59AM), http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/05/02/bin.laden.raid/
index.html.
2. See Al Qaeda’s Anwar al-Awlaki Killed in Yemen, CBSNEWS (Sept. 30,
2011, 3:08 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-202_162-20113732.html.
3. See, e.g., Tom Junod, The Lethal Presidency of Barack Obama, ESQUIRE MAG., Aug. 2012, at 100.
4. Id. at 104.
5. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985).
6. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 47 (N.Y. 1986).
7. Id. at 41.
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of the culpable aggressor and the innocent defender, the law
8
comes down on the side of protecting the life of the defender.
However, the duty to capture is far more relevant in lawenforcement situations. Police officers have a duty to attempt
capture and are only permitted to use lethal force against a
fleeing felon if the police have probable cause to believe that
9
the felon constitutes a danger to the public. In a recent case,
the Supreme Court concluded that a fleeing motorist was driving so recklessly that the police were constitutionally entitled
to believe that his reckless driving constituted a danger to the
10
public.
But the situation is markedly different in international
humanitarian law (IHL), where there simply is no codified duty
11
to attempt the capture of enemy combatants. Combatants
open themselves up to the reciprocal risk of killing, and the
lawfulness of killing combatants is based entirely on their sta12
tus as combatants. To suggest that combatants could only be
killed if capture was unfeasible would make the modern practice of aerial bombardment per se illegal. Whatever the merits
of this as a moral argument, it cannot be taken to represent the
current state of codified IHL because it would require wholesale revision of the very practice of warfare itself, and would
therefore be radically inconsistent with current and past state
13
practice since the advent of aerial warfare.
That said, IHL does include a duty to respect surrender.
Both the Geneva Conventions and the underlying chivalric customs of warfare require that an intention to surrender, effectively and unambiguously communicated, ought to be respected
8. For a discussion of the curious relevance of the wrongfulness of the
attacker, see generally George P. Fletcher, Proportionality and the Psychotic
Aggressor: A Vignette in Comparative Criminal Theory, 8 ISR. L. REV. 367
(1973) (comparing Western jurisdictional approaches to basing a right to selfdefense on the reasonableness or proportionality of the response to the provocation).
9. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11 (applying the Fourth Amendment).
10. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 384 (2007).
11. See Beth Van Schaack, The Killing of Osama Bin Laden and Anwar
Al-Aulaqi: Uncharted Legal Territory, 14 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 255,
292 (2012) (“As a matter of established IHL doctrine, there is no express duty
to capture privileged combatants in IACs in lieu of killing them in the absence
of an unambiguous offer of unconditional surrender.”).
12. Id. at 292.
13. For a historical analysis of aerial bombardment, see Charles S. Maier,
Targeting the City: Debates and Silences About the Aerial Bombing of World
War II, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 429, 433 (2005).
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14

by opposing combatants. The rationale for this rule is that
surrendered combatants are hors de combat, one step removed
from prisoner-of-war (POW) status only because they have not
15
yet been received into custody. But the duty to respect surrender should not be confused with an alleged duty to offer the
enemy the opportunity to surrender, nor is there a duty to attempt a capture prior to attempting killing. The requirement to
announce one’s presence and demand surrender—as the police
do—is a creature of the domestic law-enforcement paradigm,
not the laws of war.
But the duty to capture cannot be so cavalierly dismissed.
The use of force against suspected terrorists is complicated by
grave uncertainty over which body of law, and which normative
16
regime, applies. If IHL—and IHL alone—applies, then I argue
in this Article that there is no implied duty to capture, though
this claim will need to be defended. On the other hand, if international human-rights law (IHRL) applies, either alone or in
tandem with IHL, then the duty to capture might be relevant.
Resolving these questions requires a coherent account of
the duty to capture that spans across the diverse bodies of law
and explains what the concept means in the abstract and how
the concept is applied in more specific contexts. What emerges
from this investigation is an underlying account of necessity
that performs much of the heavy lifting in the analysis. That
said, the concept of necessity provides less cross-context unity
to the analysis than one might hope; necessity, it turns out,
14. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(b)(xii),
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute] (giving jurisdiction of war crimes to the International Criminal Court, including the refusal to
give quarter); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 41, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]
(protecting those who express an intention to surrender or are incapacitated
from attack); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva
Conventions] (regulating treatment of “[p]ersons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms”); Francis Lieber, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Order No. 100, art. 60 (Apr. 24, 1863)
[hereinafter Lieber Code] (“No body of troops has the right to declare that it
will not give, and therefore will not expect, quarter . . . .”).
15. See, e.g., Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at
136–38 (regulating the treatment of all combatants hors de combat [outside
the fight], whether due to sickness or surrender).
16. See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 256–57.
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means something quite different depending on the background
legal norms that structure each particular body of law. In other
words, it is not so clear that the concept of necessity in the domestic law of self-defense can be transplanted, without significance alteration, to the domain of IHL. The concept of necessity
turns out to be something resembling a term of art in IHL, with
a specific meaning that diverges from how the term is understood and applied in other normative regimes.
This Article proceeds by examining four potential reasons
why the duty to capture might be thought to apply to targeted
killings: (i) IHRL, not IHL, governs; (ii) IHRL and IHL both
apply at the same time; (iii) IHL on its own includes a previously unrealized duty to capture; and (iv) the U.S. Constitution (if
applicable to the attack) operates as an overlay that imposes
the requirement over and above the requirements of IHL. The
Article begins by considering the underlying issues with the
first three potential reasons; the last reason is addressed only
at the end of the Article once all issues pertaining to international law are fully addressed.
Part I concentrates on arguments that conclude that there
is no armed conflict to trigger the application of IHL, because:
(i) the armed conflict is not properly classified as either an international or non-international armed conflict; (ii) an armed
conflict is impossible against al-Qaeda because the non-state
actor is not sufficiently organized or hierarchical; and (iii) the
legal definition of “armed conflict” limits the concept to socalled hot battle zones. The analysis will suggest that the
standard scholarly view on the hot battlefield—based on the socalled “intensity” of hostilities—has systematically misunderstood the relevant precedents in this area.
Part II concentrates on the co-application of IHL and IHRL
to determine if the duty to capture can be deduced from a combination of these two bodies of law together—a methodology inspired by the Israeli Supreme Court in its Targeted Killings de17
cision. But IHRL can only be used to interpret the basic
concepts of IHL if the two normative regimes are talking the
same language.
Accordingly, this Article investigates the different senses of
necessity in IHRL and IHL and concludes that the concept of
“military necessity,” so often at the center of IHL debates, is
frequently misunderstood to mean the same thing as necessity
17. See infra note 108 and accompanying text.
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as the concept is understood in civilian contexts. The two versions of the concept operate differently because the underlying
legal assumptions of the two bodies of law are radically different—IHRL assumes that killing is illegal while IHL assumes
that the killing of combatants is presumptively privileged.
Moreover, the two bodies of law are designed for completely different purposes: IHL regulates the relationship between coequal belligerents in battle, while IHRL constrains the sovereign’s treatment of subjects under its control. The argument
will therefore conclude that there was insufficient legal support
for the variety of co-application inspired by the Israeli Supreme
Court.
For the same reasons, the IHL principle of military necessity does not require, even in the absence of IHRL, a duty to
capture. This conclusion would only be possible if one covertly
engaged in the type of norm importation already rejected in
Part II. Military necessity, by itself, never meant what it means
in other contexts: the only available option. Rather, as far back
as Francis Lieber, the principle of military necessity only required that the attack confer a bona fide military advantage.
Finally, Part III will consider the possibility of a constitutional overlay to the analysis. The source of the overlay might
attach to the conduct because the Constitution follows the flag,
18
so to speak, or more likely, constitutional rights attach because the target is an American citizen like al-Awlaki. But the
overlay is arguably inconsistent with historical practice, since
citizen combatants during World War II—fighting for the Nazi
Army—were not granted a special right to be captured, and
19
were targeted in like manner to their German comrades.
Moreover, confederate soldiers during the Civil War, all Ameri20
can citizens, were not owed a duty to capture either. Consequently, predicating the constitutional duty to capture on the
American citizenship of the target requires the marshaling of
an additional argument.
In such a case, either the Fourth of Fifth Amendments
18. See KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG?:
THE EVOLUTION OF TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 241–47 (2009) (analyzing the way geography and territoriality affect the scope of the American legal
system).
19. See Michael A. Newton, Exceptional Engagement: Protocol I and a
World United Against Terrorism, 45 TEX. INT’L L.J. 323, 338 (2009).
20. See Andrew Kent, Federal Courts, Practice and Procedure: The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1839, 1868 (2010).
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might require the U.S. government to afford the target with a
chance to contest the executive branch’s determination of his
status before a neutral decision-maker. Unfortunately, the best
Supreme Court precedents to establish this constitutional overlay all take place either within the domestic law-enforcement
context or, if they are wartime cases, within the detention con21
text, not targeting. Deep problems emerge when one analogizes from one context to the other, particularly because the U.S.
Supreme Court cases on detention all refer back to IHL in order to establish the parameters of the constitutional protection
22
regarding detention.
This Article concludes that the analysis inevitably swings
back full circle to the original issue: whether domestic or wartime targeting principles apply. The answer lies in determining
whether the U.S. government, when targeting its own citizen,
is acting as a sovereign or acting as a belligerent. If the former,
then the normative constraints of IHRL certainly apply; if the
latter, then the regulations of IHL apply. Does the citizenbelligerent stop being a citizen-subject when he or she takes up
arms against his own government? This was certainly the case
when the United States fought the Civil War against Confederate soldiers. Presumably, though, there is something deeply
distressing about concluding that the U.S. government might
consider a citizen-belligerent targetable wherever they are located, perhaps even within the continental United States. The
limiting principle that prevents this universal extension of citizen-belligerency is whether the sovereign has complete control
over the territory in question. In such instances, the sovereign
is indeed acting as a sovereign with regard to its subject and is
constrained by the principles of IHRL. In areas where the sovereign is not in complete territorial control—is not sovereign in
a sense—then the sovereign meets even the citizen (and the
armed group to which he belongs) on the battlefield as a coequal belligerent.

21. Compare Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 1 (1985) (discussing the
constitutionality of a Tennessee statute granting officers the right to use deadly force), with Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539–40 (2004) (granting U.S.
citizen enemy combatants the right of habeas corpus to challenge their detention).
22. See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (citing the Geneva Conventions).
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I. THE SCOPE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW
There are several factors that might preclude the application of IHL to a given military engagement. Although a cluster
of overlapping arguments might preclude IHL from applying,
they can all be grouped into three major categories. The first
category of arguments denies the possibility of an armed conflict when it cannot properly be classified as international or
non-international. The second category of arguments concentrates on the alleged enemy and concludes that al-Qaeda is not
sufficiently organized to qualify as a non-state actor against
whom an armed conflict is possible. The third category of arguments concentrates on the legal geography of armed conflict
and concludes that the conflict with al-Qaeda does not meet the
territorial standard as applied by the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in Prosecutor v.
23
Tadić. If any of these arguments is successful, then IHL does
not apply to the present conflict, with the consequence that
IHRL—and with it the duty to capture—might still apply to
these killings and similar killings in the future.
A. IS THE ARMED CONFLICT INTERNATIONAL OR NONINTERNATIONAL?
It was once a basic principle of international law that only
24
nation-states were proper subjects of international law. Under
this view, the only true entities that can engage in an armed
conflict are states that have legal personality under interna25
tional law. But this view has long been displaced by the necessity to make internal disputes—civil wars—subject to a min26
imal degree of legal regulation. The Geneva regime, and in
particular Common Article 3, was specifically designed with
such internal conflicts in mind, subject to a smaller—but still

23 See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 557–60
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
24. Avnita Lakhani, The Role of Citizens and the Future of International
Law: A Paradigm for a Changing World, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 159,
171 (2006).
25. See Marko Milanović & Vidan Hadzi-Vidanovic, A Taxonomy of
Armed Conflict 5–7 (Jan. 20, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=1988915.
26. Id. at 6.
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crucial—set of legal prohibitions that applied against govern27
ments and non-state actors.
The conflict with al-Qaeda presents a challenge of classifi28
cation. It cannot be an international armed conflict (IAC) because it is not an armed conflict between two states—in other
29
words, it isn’t international enough. On the other hand, it
cannot be a non-international armed conflict (NIAC) because it
is far too international. Because it is not confined to the geography of one nation-state, such as an internal civil war, and because it crosses transnational borders, it cannot qualify as an
30
NIAC. So to the extent that the presumptive armed conflict
with al-Qaeda clearly crosses transnational borders, it cannot
31
be an NIAC. This structure of this argument tries to sandwich
the armed conflict between an IAC and an NIAC and conclude
that because the armed conflict with al-Qaeda qualifies as nei32
ther, it cannot be an armed conflict at all. It cannot be a true
IAC because it involves a non-state actor, and it cannot be an
NIAC because it is international. Being neither, it is no armed
33
conflict at all.
Several scholars have responded to this style of argument
by altering the classification scheme and suggesting that a
third category, unrecognized in any codified treaty or conven34
tion, captures the armed conflict with al-Qaeda. Such a cate27. Id. at 11.
28. Id. at 13.
29. For a discussion, see Dapo Akande, Classification of Armed Conflicts:
Relevant Legal Concepts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF
CONFLICTS 32, 46 (Elizabeth Wilmshurst ed., 2012).
30. Id. at 50.
31. See, e.g., Noam Lubell, The War (?) Against al-Qaeda, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CLASSIFICATION OF CONFLICTS, supra note 29, at 421,
429.
32. For a normative argument that the distinction between international
and non-international armed conflicts is obsolete, see Akande, supra note 29,
at 39; Eric Talbot Jensen, Applying a Sovereign Agency Theory of the Law of
Armed Conflict, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 685, 702 (2012) (criticizing bifurcation and
arguing that the same international rules should apply whenever the sovereign exercises military force, regardless of the status of its enemy); James G.
Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV.
RED CROSS 313, 314 (2003).
33. For a general discussion, see Sylvain Vité, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Legal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69 (2009) (discussing issues related to the lack
of definitional understanding of armed conflict).
34. But see Andreas Paulus & Mindia Vashakmadze, Asymmetrical War
and the Notion of Armed Conflict—A Tentative Conceptualization, 91 INT’L
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gory would be a transnational NIAC, an internationalized
35
NIAC, or some other hybrid notion or mixed category. The
standard response to these suggestions is that they are purely
speculative and aspirational—a statement about what the law
36
ought to be, not a description of the current state of the law.
However, the correct answer to the paradox lies not in an
aspirational change to the law but rather a deeper analysis of
the original classification scheme. The legal evidence for the allegedly mutually exhaustive categories stems from a textual
reading of the Geneva Conventions and their related protocols,
which can be summarized in the following way. First, Common
Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions refers to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the

REV. RED CROSS 95, 111 (2009) (arguing for sufficiency of current paradigms).
35. See, e.g., Geoffrey S. Corn, Hamdan, Lebanon, and the Regulation of
Hostilities: The Need to Recognize a Hybrid Category of Armed Conflict, 40
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 295, 300 (2006) (noting the “limitations inherent in
the traditional Geneva Convention-based law-triggering paradigm”); cf.
Akande, supra note 29, at 39 (interpreting the Geneva Conventions as applying to all international armed conflicts).
36. Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic argue that this strategy is wrong because there is no a priori concept of armed conflict simpliciter prior to the determination of its status as international or non-international. On this basis
they fault arguments that start from the presumption that an armed conflict
exists and it must be categorized in one of the two existing categories or a new
third category. See Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 25, at 13 (criticizing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006)); see also Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2468–70 (2008); Dino
Kritsiotis, The Tremors of Tadić, 43 ISR. L. REV. 262, 263 (2010). There are
two responses to this critique. First, one must sidestep the ordinary meaning
of the term “armed conflict” as being illusory and hence mere shorthand for
the phrase “either an IAC or NIAC”—a curious result since both the legal literature and the Tadić decision are replete with mentions of the phrase “armed
conflict.” Second, the argument by itself does not entail that the armed conflict
with al-Qaeda does not qualify as an armed conflict “not of an international
character”—an additional argument would be needed. Third, and most important, the argument merely entails that there is no a priori definition of
armed conflict in the Geneva Conventions, but this does not establish that
there is no a priori concept of armed conflict in customary law. Furthermore,
the ICTY definition of armed conflict from the Tadić case is not a formal
source of international law; it is simply one interpretation of the treaty language and it offers no analysis regarding a customary definition of armed conflict. Despite some anxiety that an abstract definition would be difficult to construct. See Stewart, supra note 32, at 327, one could imagine the following
commonsensical definition: “protracted armed violence between any organized
armed groups.”
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state of war is not recognized by one of them,” thus demonstrating that IACs necessarily involve conflicts between states.
Second, Common Article 3 refers to “armed conflicts not of an
international character occurring in the territory of one of the
38
High Contracting Parties,” thus supposedly demonstrating
that NIACs are legally defined as being geographically constrained to the territory of one state. Since the armed conflict
with al-Qaeda fulfills neither the Common Article 2 definition
nor the Common Article 3 definition, the conflict with al-Qaeda
per se does not qualify as an armed conflict under IHL, though
it might be the case that fighting in a particular state—say
Yemen—might meet the Common Article 3 definition. But the
overall conflict against al-Qaeda would not, under this view, be
legally recognized as an “armed conflict” triggering the rules of
39
IHL. Further support for this view allegedly comes from Additional Protocol II (APII), which states in Article 1(1) that it covers
all armed conflicts which are not covered by Article 1 of [Additional
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting
Party between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise
such control over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out
sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
40
Protocol.

Under the view being examined, this APII provision both mirrors the geographical limitation on NIACs first offered in
37. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; see also Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217,
75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 2,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention].
38. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32–
34.
39. Scholars who hold this view sometimes resort to conflating the global
armed conflict with al-Qaeda described above with the Bush Administration’s
early rhetoric of a global war on terror. See, e.g., Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic,
supra note 25, at 46.
40. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
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Common Article 3, but then also adds additional content to the
standard by demanding additional criteria of operational command, territorial control, and capacity for sustained military
operations.
This view is mistaken, however. A closer examination of
the structure of Common Articles 2 and 3 suggests a stronger
textual analysis animated by a consideration of the purpose of
the Geneva Conventions. To think of the Geneva Conventions
as primarily definitional—like say the background rules of
treaty interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on
41
Treaties —is to fundamentally misunderstand the purpose of
Geneva, which was to enact regulations regarding the conduct
of warfare. Common Article 2 defines IACs not for the purpose
of defining them in abstracto but rather to limit which conflicts
are governed by the provisions contained in the rest of the Geneva Conventions. And, of course, it is almost axiomatic that
the prohibitions contained therein would necessarily involve
armed conflicts between two or more “High Contracting Parties,” since the signatories could not regulate—by treaty—the
conduct of non-signatories. Under standard rules of treaty interpretation (e.g., consent), such obligations would be impossible to impose on non-signatories as a matter of pure treaty
42
law. Common Article 2 is thus silent on the issue of regulating
conflicts with non-signatories, with the only proviso that during
a multi-state armed conflict among signatories and nonsignatories, the signatories are bound to follow the Geneva
rules between them, and are also bound to follow the Geneva
rules against the non-signatory if the non-signatory “accepts
43
and applies the provisions thereof.” So the structure of the Article makes clear that it is not defining international armed
conflicts but rather laying out the parameters for which armed
conflicts are subject to the regulations of Geneva.
Common Article 3 displays a similar structure. The provision applies a smaller set of protections—the so-called miniConvention—to conflicts “not of an international character,”
but which occur “in the territory of one of the High Contracting
41. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May
23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
42. Marco Odello, Fundamental Standards of Humanity: A Common Language of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 15, 15 (Roberta Arnold & Noelle Quenivet eds., 2008).
43. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 3, 75 U.N.T.S. at 32–
34.
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Parties.” The latter phrase is not meant to define the former
phrase but rather limit its application. The contracting parties
to Geneva were regulating NIACs that occur on their respective
territory and were not regulating NIACs that do not. To suggest that they were abstractly pronouncing that they were defining that the latter category simply does not exist is a bit
farfetched. Instead, it seems more likely that the High Contracting Parties were limiting their Common Article 3 regulation of warfare to only a subset of NIACs (occurring on their
territory between the government and rebel forces or between
two non-state armed groups), either because they did not wish
to regulate the others or perhaps simply because they were not
yet thinking of the various forms such conflicts could take. Either way, it is clear that, like Common Article 2, the signatories
were regulating conflicts for which their purpose and authority
to regulate were crystal clear. To suggest, on the basis of Common Article 3, that IHL does not apply to NIACs that exceed
the boundaries of a contracting party is to misread the function
of the second clause “in the territory . . . .”
It is also worth noting that if Common Articles 2 and 3
were meant to function as a classification scheme, they would
have been constructed in a far different manner. One could
very well imagine a treaty provision that starts by saying:
“There are two and only two forms of armed conflict: IAC and
NIAC. An IAC is defined as x. An NIAC is defined as y.” But
that is not how Geneva was drafted.
What then of Additional Protocol II and its additional requirements for NIACs, including their location in the territory
of a contracting party as well as the organizational structure of
the non-state armed group involved in the conflict? Here again,
the purpose was not to add additional requirements to the definition of an NIAC. Rather, the purpose was to apply a larger
set of humanitarian protections to the types of conflicts regulated by Common Article 3; the APII requirement that the nonstate armed group be sufficiently organized to maintain sustained military operations is meant to clarify that the signatories are accepting the APII limitations for conflicts on their territory and against non-state armed groups that are at least
capable of reciprocating those limitations. Regarding conflicts
that do not take place on their territory, or do not involve

44. Id.
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armed groups that could reciprocate the humanitarian treat45
ment, the APII is predictably silent.
Even if none of this were correct, it is important to note
that the United States, like many world powers, is not a signa46
tory to APII and has never consented to its application. Furthermore, it is completely wrong to think of Article 1 of APII as
simply adding more content to the Common Article 3 definition
of armed conflict. Rather, Common Article 3 and APII represent distinct normative regimes, as has been confirmed by the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which has
concluded that the “restrictive definition is relevant for the application of Protocol II only, but does not extend to the law of
47
NIAC in general.” Finally, the International Criminal Court
(ICC) Statute even refers to NIACs that do not meet the definitional requirements of APII, thus confirming that even the in48
ternational court regards these two regimes as separate.
What then of the alleged customary status of the protections contained in Common Article 3 and APII? With regard to
Common Article 3, its customary status is on strong footing,
whereas APII and its contentious nature among the world’s
military powers makes it ill-suited for meeting the standards of
a customary norm, and the United States has persistently ob49
jected to APII. Either way, even if Common Article 3 is now

45. This view does not entail that armed conflicts falling outside of this
classification scheme are unregulated by international law. Rather, the argument is that if a given armed conflict does not meet the text of the Geneva
standard, then the armed conflict is regulated by customary prohibitions that
emerge from the Geneva regime but apply to a larger number of conflicts.
46. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 675 (showing that the United States has not signed the Protocol).
47. See Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict”
Defined in International Humanitarian Law?, ICRC 4 (Mar. 2008), available
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf.
48. Id. (“The Statute of the International Criminal Court . . . confirms the
existence of a definition of a non-international armed conflict not fulfilling the
criteria of Protocol II.”); see also Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2)(f),
(“Paragraph 2(e) applies to armed conflicts not of an international character
and thus does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions . . . .”); Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 34, at 105 (noting that the
Rome Statute “exacerbates the problem” already existing because of the conflicting standards in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II); Vité, supra
note 33, at 81–82 (canvassing different interpretations of drafters’ intent regarding Rome Statute article 8(2)).
49. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes, II, A U.S. Government Response to the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law, 89 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 443, 448
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considered jus cogens, and APII has ripened into customary
law, this ripening leaves completely open the correct analysis of
these provisions. One cannot offer an analysis of Common Articles 2 and 3 and APII and then claim that their customary status automatically supports one reading over another. It is, of
course, logically possible that there is better interpretation of
these treaty protections and it is that interpretation which is
now binding as a matter of custom. Asserting the customary
status of Geneva does not entail which normative interpretation has become custom.
An additional benefit of this view is that it accords with the
facts on the ground. al-Qaeda attacked the United States and
continues to attack the United States and its allies, and in turn
the United States is trying to destroy al-Qaeda and kill its
50
members. If that isn’t an armed conflict, it would be hard to
conceive of what is an armed conflict. The question, though, is
how to classify it. But the problem about classification should
not distract one from the inestimable truth regarding the exist51
ence of an armed conflict.
B. IS AL-QAEDA SUFFICIENTLY ORGANIZED AND HIERARCHICAL?
There is, however, a second asserted legal basis that would
block the application of IHL to targeted killings. According to
most scholars, IHL is only triggered when a state or other organized armed group is engaged in a conflict against another
organized armed group that is sufficiently well organized to be
capable of mounting sustained military operations while also
meeting the standards of conduct embodied in IHL—in essence,
52
the trigger requirements for APII. Under this proposed view,
(2007) (noting that the Additional Protocols are not customary and that a significant number of states, including the United States, have rejected them).
50. See, e.g., President Barack Obama, Address on the War in Afghanistan
(May 1, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/world/jan-june12/
obamaspeech_05-01.html (“Our goal is to destroy al Qaeda . . . .”).
51. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Defining Armed Conflict, 13 J. CONFLICT &
SECURITY L. 393, 393–94 (2009) (discussing the International Law Association’s report on the meaning of armed conflict, which concludes the United
States has been engaged in armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq, but that it
is not engaged in a global armed conflict).
52. See, e.g., Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 47, at 3 (1979) (citing Dietrich Schindler, The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the
Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE
DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 147 (1979)) (“[N]on-governmental groups involved
in the conflict must be considered as ‘parties to the conflict’, meaning that they
possess organized armed forces. This means for example that these forces have
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al-Qaeda is neither sufficiently well organized to sustain mili53
tary operations nor does it follow the precepts of IHL. Consequently, the United States cannot be engaged in an armed con54
flict with al-Qaeda. Since there is no armed conflict, IHL does
not apply; since IHL does not apply, drone attacks cannot be
justified by the IHL legal regime.
What are the standards by which al-Qaeda—and other
non-state actors—ought to be judged regarding its internal
structure? Although it is clear that some level of organization is
required, it is unclear whether IHL requires any particular
55
type or form of organization. Potential standards that have
been proposed include centralized organization and hierarchical organization, both of which have been used to claim that
al-Qaeda is not sufficiently organized, or not organized in the
to be under a certain command structure and have the capacity to sustain military operations.”).
53. Even territorial control is not, by itself, a triggering requirement,
though scholars often mistakenly state that it is. Rather, territorial control is
an indicator that the non-state actor is capable of carrying out military operations. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 60 (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc639096.pdf (“[C]ontrol over the territory by the relevant organised armed
groups has been a key factor in determining whether they had the ability to
carry out military operations for a prolonged period of time.”). However, some
non-state actors might be capable of launching military attacks even in the
absence of territorial control, and in fact terrorist organizations often eschew
territorial control to concentrate on their operational capacities.
54. See, e.g., NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST
NON-STATE ACTORS 118 (2010) (“As for Al-Qaeda it is hard to conclude that it
currently possesses the characteristics of a party to a conflict.”); Kai Ambos &
Josef Alkatout, Has ‘Justice Been Done’? The Legality of Bin Laden’s Killing
Under International Law, 45 ISR. L. REV. 341, 347–50 (2012) (“These criteria
are not met by a loose and decentralized terrorist network such as Al Qaeda.”);
Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON
THE USE OF LETHAL FORCE 263−91 (Simon Bronitt et al. eds., 2012) (arguing
that the United States’s use of drones in Afghanistan does not meet international law rules Jordan J. Paust, Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors
and Permissibility of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J. TRANSNAT’L L. &
POL’Y 237, 260 (2009) (“[S]ome non-state actors, such as al Qaeda, do not meet
the test for insurgent status.”). On the issue of organization generally, compare RONALD C. SLYE & BETH VAN SCHAACK, The Internationalization of
Crimes, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: ESSENTIALS 115 (2009) (requiring
a level of organization before triggering IHL), with Marco Sassoli, Taking
Armed Groups Seriously: Ways to Improve Their Compliance with International Humanitarian Law, 1 INT’L HUMANITARIAN LEGAL STUD. 5, 14 (2010) (requiring only the existence of a genuine armed group).
55. See Paulus & Vashakmadze, supra note 34, at 117 (requiring only
minimal level of organization without any particular form).
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56

right way. But the legal support for centralization is misplaced and stems mostly from ICTY jurisprudence that listed
centralization—particularly a command structure and headquarters—as one indicative factor in determining whether an
57
armed group was sufficiently organized for purposes of IHL.
Furthermore, it is clear why the ICTY was considering this element, since for its judicial work the existence of headquarters
was highly relevant in determining that various armed groups
operating in the former Yugoslavia were indeed sufficiently
well organized to be engaged in an armed conflict (for the most
58
part they were). However, the ICTY has never once said that
centralization in a formal headquarters was a sine qua non of
“organization” necessary for triggering the application of IHL.
As for the requirement that the armed group be hierarchical, again, the question is what kind of hierarchy. If one
means a centralized hierarchy, then the requirement just falls
back on the notion of centralization. If it is different, then other
59
forms of hierarchy must be permissible. Although some scholars have claimed that al-Qaeda is not hierarchical, this can only be possible if one is using the notion of a centralized hierar60
chy. Assuming that al-Qaeda is a diffuse network of separate
56. See, e.g., Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 349–50 (noting that alQaeda lacks the hierarchic and centralized command structure to meet the
traditional organizational requirements).
57. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment,
¶ 60 (Int’l Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008), available at http://
www.icty.org/x/cases/haradinaj/tjug/en/080403.pdf (“[I]ndicative factors include the existence of a command structure and disciplinary rules and mechanisms with the group; the existence of headquarters . . . .”); Prosecutor v.
Limaj, Case No. IT-03-66-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 94–134 (Int’l Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Nov. 30 2005), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/limaj/tjug/
en/lim-tj051130-e.pdf (describing the complex command structure in finding
the characteristics of an organized armed group).
58. See generally Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3:
More than Meets the Eye, 93 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 189, 192 (2011) (noting the
following factors for organization: “the existence of a command structure and
disciplinary rules and mechanisms within the armed group; the existence of
headquarters; the ability to procure, transport, and distribute arms; the
group’s ability to plan, co-ordinate, and carry out military operations, including troop movements and logistics; its ability to negotiate and conclude agreements such as ceasefire or peace accords”).
59. See Kenneth Watkin, Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and
the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Interpretive Guidance, 42 N.Y.U.
J. INT’L L. & POL. 641, 679 (2010) (discussing structure of al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations).
60. Compare Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 349 (noting that alQaeda “lacks the required hierarchic, centralised command structure”), with
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franchises, each one operating under independent command, it
would still be the case that each independent franchise is sufficiently organized to meet the standard for participation in an
armed conflict. Another view holds that the larger organization
is one non-state actor, with each affiliate—al-Qaeda core in Pakistan/Afghanistan, AQAP, al-Qaeda in Iraq—being roughly
61
analogous to separate battalions within the same army. The
legitimacy of this metaphor depends, of course, on the degree of
centralized control over these units. Although there is no doubt
some centralized oversight—or attempted oversight—by alQaeda core over the regional affiliates, the nature and quality
of this control, though perhaps “operational” in the general
sense, may not arise to operational in the very specific way that
a traditional centralized army headquarters coordinates the
behavior of its battalions on a daily basis. Whether that difference in degree—not kind—is sufficient to defeat the requirement of a centralized hierarchy depends on whether the centralized authority must be exercised on a daily level, or
whether a coordinated grand strategic vision is sufficient to
demonstrate that centralized authority.
In any event, less hinges on this analysis than one might
initially believe. Even if al-Qaeda does not represent a single
atomic non-state actor, each regional affiliate certainly meets
the definition, in which case the United States is still engaged
in an armed conflict with AQAP in Yemen and al-Qaeda core in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, given the attacks committed by these groups and the large number of drone strikes reportedly
62
launched by the United States in response to these attacks.
Some scholars who segment the analysis by affiliates have then
gone on to argue that bin Laden’s killing could not be justified
63
as a response to recent attacks by other affiliates. FurtherThird Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 4(A)(2)(a), 75 U.N.T.S. at 138
(only requiring that the group be “commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates,” and not dictating any particular form of hierarchy).
61. See, e.g., Rachel Oswald, Badly Weakened Al-Qaeda Still Seen as Top
Terrorist Threat to U.S., NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE (Feb. 1, 2012), http://
www.nti.org/gsn/article/even-decline-al-qaeda-still-seen-top-terrorist-threat-us
(quoting U.S. National Intelligence Director James Clapper as saying that the
“core al-Qaeda will be of largely symbolic importance to the global jihadist
movement. But regional affiliates . . . and to a lesser extent, small cells and
individuals will drive the global jihad agenda”).
62. See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 54, at 265−67 (describing the increase
in drone attacks in Pakistan).
63. See Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 350 (arguing that when bin
Laden was killed, al-Qaeda was decentralized and bin Laden was not acting as
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more, if forced to tie the killing to attacks by the same affiliate,
the bin Laden killing took place too long after the original 9/11
attacks in the United States, and that whatever armed conflict
existed between the United States and al-Qaeda core had long
since withered away with the al-Qaeda core’s degraded capacity
64
to launch attacks.
This view is mistaken because it conflates jus ad bellum
with jus in bello. Even if it were the case that al-Qaeda core
had not launched a major attack in some time, the United
States certainly had continuously engaged in military strikes
against al-Qaeda core during that time, and that alone is sufficient for the application of IHL to the conflict. If the United
States did, hypothetically, lack a justification under international law for such attacks, this might demonstrate the existence of a jus ad bellum violation (say, aggression), but it would
not demonstrate the existence of a jus in bello violation, since
IHL would continue to apply as long as the United States continued to engage in military strikes and the al-Qaeda core per65
sisted as an organized armed group during that time. And it is
certainly the case that the United States has maintained a con66
sistent barrage of attacks in these areas during that time.
The final argument that al-Qaeda, either in total or its particular affiliates, cannot engage in an armed conflict with the
United States, stems from the fact that al-Qaeda members, as
terrorists, do not follow the laws and customs of war, according
67
to the APII standard. But this argument confuses capacity
with compliance. The test is not whether the organized armed
group complies with the laws and customs of war or not. If that
were the standard, then it would be ipso facto impossible to ever engage in an armed conflict, and trigger IHL, with a group
that betrays the central tenets of IHL—thus creating a system
of perverse incentives. Moreover, such a standard completely
misreads the structure of the APII standard, which requires
that the armed group be sufficiently organized to have the capacity to follow the laws and customs of war as embodied by
Geneva. The rationale for this functional standard embodied in
the commander of an organization within the meaning of IHL).
64. Id. (“Al Qaeda’s activity had slowed down; it therefore no longer posed
a serious military threat, nor did it have a centralised military command
structure.”).
65. Cf. O’Connell, supra note 54, at 280 (emphasizing illegality under the
law of state responsibility for such incursions).
66. Id. at 265−67.
67. Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
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APII (to “exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military op68
erations and to implement this Protocol”) is that it would absurd for a state party to remain compelled by treaty to follow
the Geneva proscriptions against groups that are incapable of
returning the favor in reciprocal fashion. But whether they do
or not is irrelevant. As for al-Qaeda, it is clear that the group
has no interest in following the central tenets of Geneva, but
that decision remains a choice. Al-Qaeda groups are wellorganized enough—indeed devastatingly so—to wear a fixed
emblem recognizable at a distance, to carry arms openly, to observe the principle of distinction, and to treat prisoners of war
humanely. The fact that they have chosen the craft of terror
over the path of IHL compliance in no way diminishes their ca69
pacity to meet the functional criteria embodied in APII.
C. THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHY OF ARMED CONFLICT
The third and final category of possible obstacles to applying IHL to these killings revolves around the actual location of
the killings. Under a geographical understanding of armed conflict, the application of IHL is limited to areas with sufficient
70
intensity of fighting—the so-called hot battlefield. Under this
view, only within this zone does IHL apply; everywhere else,
IHRL and its capture-first requirement arguably applies. Critics of the Obama drone program have asserted that although
an armed conflict against al-Qaeda may exist in Afghanistan
68. Id. art. 1, ¶ 1, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 611.
69. For the moment it is beyond the scope of this Article to address
whether it is fair to bind non-state groups with rules of international law that
they are incapable of participating in through the formation of state practice,
opinio juris, or treaty negotiation. For a discussion of this issue, see Sandesh
Sivakumaran, Binding Armed Opposition Groups, 55 INT’L CRIM. L. Q. 369,
377 (2006).
70. See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Killing Awlaki Was Illegal, Immoral and
Dangerous, CNN (Oct. 1, 2011), http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/
10/01/killing-awlaki-was-illegal-immoral-and-dangerous (charging that the
U.S. assertion that it is involved in a worldwide armed conflict with al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and associated forces “defies common sense”). For a discussion of
geographic parameters in contemporary armed conflict, see also Kenneth Anderson, Targeted Killing and Drone Warfare: How We Came to Debate Whether
There is a “Legal Geography of War,” in FUTURE CHALLENGES IN NATIONAL
SECURITY AND LAW (Peter Berkowitz ed., forthcoming 2013), available at
http://media.hoover.org/sites/default/files/documents/FutureChallenges_Ander
son.pdf; Laurie R. Blank, Defining the Battlefield in Contemporary Conflict
and Counterterrorism: Understanding the Parameters of the Zone of Combat,
39 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 14−25 (2010).
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and the tribal regions of Pakistan, the conflict did not extend to
Abbottabad where bin Laden was located and killed, or in other
71
areas where drones are deployed. But the analysis in this section will suggest that the standard scholarly view on the socalled hot battle zone—based on the so-called “intensity” of hostilities—has systematically misunderstood the relevant precedents in this area, which are actually drawn from criminal cases, and not IHL at all.
The first task in evaluating the hot-battlefield argument is
to understand and define the legal standard that it seeks to apply. The ICRC concluded that “the hostilities must reach a minimum level of intensity. This may be the case, for example,
when the hostilities are of a collective character or when the
government is obliged to use military force against the insur72
gents, instead of mere police forces.” The standard citation for
the “intensity” requirement comes from the ICTY’s decision in
Tadić, and proponents of a restrictive hot-battlefield view often
cite that landmark case for the proposition that IHL does not
73
apply outside the zone of intense fighting. This represents a
profound misreading of the logic of the Tadić decision.
In Tadić, the defendant (on interlocutory appeal) had argued to the court that no armed conflict existed in the Prijedor
74
region where the charged crimes took place. If there was no
armed conflict in the area, neither the defendant (nor anyone)
could have committed war crimes there, thus depriving the
ICTY of jurisdiction over the allegations (hence the interlocutory nature of the appeal since the argument was fundamentally
75
jurisdictional).

71. See Ambos & Alkatout, supra note 54, at 352 (“[T]he location where
the killing took place (Abbottabad) is not only situated outside a reasonable
‘spillover’ area . . . but also outside the actual Pakistan battle zone.”);
O’Connell, supra note 54, at 281 (“The jus in bello will apply if there is an
armed conflict in the state. Peacetime criminal law applies if not.”).
72. Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 47, at 3.
73. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 561–68
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf
(using
the
scope and intensity of armed conflict to determine that IHL applied).
74. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence
Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction ¶¶ 128–37 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
For the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (describing defendant’s arguments that the
Tribunal does not have jurisdiction when armed conflicts are internal).
75. Id.
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The ICTY Appeals Chamber flatly rejected the defendant’s
argument that the armed conflict was limited to Prijedor where
the actual fighting was taking place, stating in plain terms
that: “The definition of ‘armed conflict’ varies depending on
whether the hostilities are international or internal but, contrary to Appellant’s contention, the temporal and geographical
scope of both internal and international armed conflicts ex76
tends beyond the exact time and place of hostilities.” The Appeals Chamber went on to note that a temporal restriction was
inapposite as well, since the Geneva Conventions make clear
that restrictions continue to apply after the fighting has reced77
ed.
As to the geographical scope of the armed conflict, the
ICTY correctly referred to the view that IACs apply to the entire territory of the parties to the conflict, since many of the
Geneva restrictions, such as the treatment of prisoners of war,
apply “not just to the vicinity of actual hostilities” but to the en78
tire territory of the state. For example, it would be absurd if a
state party could circumvent the Geneva restrictions on POW
treatment if it moved the prisoners to an outlying district away
79
from the battlefield (as one might expect them to do). Although some scholars concede this point with regard to IACs,
which externally regulate nation-states and therefore obviously
apply to the entire territory, they deny the same point with regard to NIACs, thus creating an asymmetry between the two
80
types of armed conflict. Under this type of scheme, IACs apply
to entire states, but NIACs only apply to hot battlefield zones;
outside of these intense zones of fighting, only IHRL applies.
But the ICTY flatly rejected the possibility of this asymmetry, concluding that the “geographical and temporal frame of
reference for in Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction internal armed
conflicts is similarly broad,” because the Common Article 3 protections apply “outside the narrow geographical context of the
81
actual theatre of combat operations.” The same broad reading
76. Id. ¶ 67.
77. Id.
78. Id. ¶ 68.
79. See id. (“With respect to prisoners of war, the Convention applies to
combatants in the power of the enemy; it makes no difference whether they
are kept in the vicinity of hostilities.”).
80. See, e.g., Vité, supra note 33, at 89 (“It is nonetheless not certain
whether the territorial aspect is indeed a constitutive factor of noninternational armed conflict.”).
81. Tadić Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 69.
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applies to the temporal scope of armed conflict as well, since
the Common Article 3 protections apply in NIACs even after
the intense fighting has subsided.
What limiting principle was the ICTY willing to offer to
explain the outer reaches of the geographical and temporal
scope of armed conflicts? In its reading of the Geneva protections, the ICTY offered a legally and philosophically astute
standard based on a causal criterion: “The nexus required is only a relationship between the conflict and the deprivation of
liberty, not that the deprivation occurred in the midst of bat82
tle.” In other words, if there is a sufficiently close causal connection between the event and the armed conflict, then IHL
applies, even if not in the middle of battle.
Applying all of these principles together, the ICTY distilled
the following statement of law:
International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such
armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a
general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of
the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes
83
place there.

How then has the Tadić opinion been so consistently misunderstood? Readers have taken its reference to the “intensity”
of fighting and have then applied this standard blindly without
reference to the manner in which the ICTY applied it—in particular the ICTY Appeals Chamber’s explicit rejection of a nar84
rowly construed geography of armed conflict. In fact, Tadić
standards for the opposite proposition: the notion of armed conflict should be applied broadly in both time and space, beyond
the zone of intense fighting, to events that are causally connected to that intense fighting, until such time as a lasting
peace is accomplished and the conflict is completed.
82. Id. ¶ 69–70.
83. Id. ¶ 70. Applying this standard, the ICTY concluded, “Applying the
foregoing concept of armed conflicts to this case, we hold that the alleged
crimes were committed in the context of an armed conflict. Fighting among the
various entities within the former Yugoslavia began in 1991, continued
through the summer of 1992 when the alleged crimes are said to have been
committed, and persists to this day. Notwithstanding various temporary
cease-fire agreements, no general conclusion of peace has brought military operations in the region to a close. These hostilities exceed the intensity requirements applicable to both international and internal armed conflicts.” Id.
84. Id. ¶ 69.
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Why was the ICTY so willing to dispense with a narrow
geographical and temporal definition of armed conflict? As
Margaret deGuzman has ably demonstrated, international
criminal law is in an expansionist phase, and the ICTY was at
the forefront of that movement in 1995 when the Tadić inter85
locutory appeal was rendered. If the court had found that IHL
did not apply to Prijedor, no war crimes prosecutions would be
possible against the defendant and other individuals who com86
mitted killings. Viewed cynically, the court’s business depend87
ed on a finding that IHL applied to the region in question.
At issue here is that international criminal lawyers and international human-rights lawyers have exactly opposite interests with regard to the scope of IHL. For international criminal
lawyers, the expansion of IHL is a good and necessary development. The more conduct that is governed by IHL, the more
conduct can be described as a war crime and prosecuted in a
88
court of law. Although genocide and crimes against humanity
have been untethered from a nexus with armed conflict, these
two categories of crimes have additional doctrinal requirements
that often prove to be an impediment to their application to
89
particular conflicts. The expansion of international criminal
law is parasitic upon an underlying expansion of IHL, since
war crimes simply represent the criminalization of underlying
85. Margaret M. deGuzman, How Serious Are International Crimes? The
Gravity Problem in International Criminal Law, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
18, 36−53 (2012). It should also be noted that IHL’s engagement with the rules
for non-international armed conflicts is long and deep, especially since the
Lieber Code was formulated for the conduct of an internal civil conflict. Cf.
LAURA PERNA, THE FORMATION OF THE TREATY LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICTS 39−41 (2006) (discussing the importance of the Spanish
Civil War in formation of IHL rules).
86. See deGuzman, supra note 85, at 38 (“Until [the Tadić] decision, the
prevailing view was that international law extended individual liability only
to crimes committed in international armed conflicts.” (emphasis added)).
87. See id. at 22 (discussing the distinction between international and internal armed conflict, and noting that “[r]easoning that international humanitarian law should apply as broadly as possible, judges have taken a fairly expansive approach to that distinction thereby effectively diminishing the
gravity required for international adjudication of war crimes”).
88. See Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 5, 2187 U.N.T.S. at 90. (“The
[International Criminal] Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute
with respect to the following crimes: (a) The crime of genocide; (b) Crimes
against humanity; (c) War crimes; (d) The crime of aggression.”).
89. In the case of genocide, it is special intent. Id. art. 6. In the case of
crimes against humanity, the widespread and systematic nature of the attacks, and in particular the state or organizational plan or policy requirement.
Id. art. 7.

1292

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[97:1268

norms that originally emerge from this other body of law cen90
tered on the existence of an armed conflict.
On the other hand, the international human-rights lawyers
have the opposite interest. International human-rights law ap91
plies chiefly in situations where IHL does not apply. Unlike
international criminal-law norms, which are parasitic upon
92
IHL norms, IHRL is a normative competitor to IHL. Simply
put, IHRL is universal in nature and application (according to
its adherents), and the lex specialis of IHL carves out a distinct
normative regime where IHRL does not apply (or at the very
least takes a back seat to the more primary rules regarding
93
targeting and detainability that come from IHL). International human-rights lawyers are therefore strongly inclined to view
the scope and applicability of IHL in its narrowest possible
94
terms.
In a sense the two camps are both correct because they are
each looking at different sides of IHL. International criminal
law is primarily concerned with the restrictions on conduct imposed by IHL, some of which are then criminalized by international criminal law: the prohibition against torture, against
cruel treatment of POWs, the declaration that no quarter will
95
be given, etc. This is the side of IHL that restricts how participants in armed conflicts conduct themselves, and the international criminal lawyer has every reason to expand these hu90. Cf. Payam Akhavan, Reconciling Crimes Against Humanity with the
Laws of War: Human Rights, Armed Conflict, and the Limits of Progressive
Jurisprudence, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 21, 22 (2008) (“Recent decisions reveal a
temptation to dilute the laws of war in order to criminalize civilian suffering
by invoking the broader concept of cries against humanity.”).
91. Unless, of course, it can be co-applied. See infra Part II.C.
92. See David Luban, Military Lawyers and the Two Cultures Problem,
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 20) (“Humanitarianism
has little to do with human rights; its source is compassion and pity, not
recognition of individual humans as rights-bearers.”).
93. See id. (“Human rights law is for peacetime, and the [law of armed
conflict] vision emphasizes the laws of war as lex specialis, ‘special law’ that
displaces more general law under the ‘rule of specialty.’ That means it displaces human rights law whenever peace gives way to war.”). But see id. at 29
(“Human rights law may provide lesser protections in wartime than in peacetime, but its obligations don’t go away, and the lex specialis never supplants
them.”).
94. See id.
95. Mark D. Kielsgard, War on the International Criminal Court, 8 N.Y.
CITY L. REV. 1, 4 (discussing modern international criminal law, and noting
that “[s]ince Nuremberg and Tokyo, there have been 274 multilateral treaties
ratified that require states to criminalize certain conduct”).
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manizing restrictions as broadly as possible. It is a noble impulse.
On the other hand, the international human-rights lawyer
is primarily concerned with the privilege granted by IHL,
which is possibly the most severe privilege in any legal regime:
the privilege of combatancy, or the right to kill enemy forces
96
with legal impunity. From the vantage point of international
human-rights law, IHL—and its privilege of combatancy that it
grants to its subjects wherever it is applied—is a moral disaster, one that licenses wholesale killing of thousands of combatants and potentially millions of civilians as long as their killing
97
is collateral and meets the demands of proportionality. From
this viewpoint of its privileges granted, IHL ought to be restricted and restrained as far and as much as possible, limited
to tightly controlled situations where it, as a body of law, can do
98
as little damage as possible. This underscores the desire for
international human-rights lawyers to view IHL as constrained
in time and space to a hot battlefield. And what of the humanizing effects of the restrictions on conduct inherent in IHL? International human-rights lawyers are not so impressed with
them; they have their own set of restrictions—these ones universal—already in their legal toolkit, ready to deploy on and off
99
the battlefield. The participants and victims do not need extra
protections from warfare if the protections of human-rights law
were applied globally and universally as they should be. So IHL
is more of a disaster than anything else.
This partially explains why the ICTY was in an expansionist mode; it was more concerned with the prohibitions of IHL
100
than the privileges of IHL. One might argue that this fact
96. Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 43, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23
(“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that
is to say, they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”).
97. See Akhavan, supra note 90, at 34 (“In other words, if a brutal military attack is aimed primarily at intimidating enemy forces and offers substantial military advantage, it is deemed to be lawful even if it spreads terror
among the civilian population.”).
98. See id. at 28.
99. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8) [hereinafter Nuclear Weapons] (stating that “protection of the [ICCPR] does not cease in times of war . . .”).
100. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Judgment, ¶ 96 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), available at http://www
.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (“This body of law is not
grounded on formalistic postulates . . . . Rather, it is a realistic body of law,
grounded on the notion of effectiveness and inspired by the aim of deterring
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should color our analysis, such that the ICTY’s discussion of
the scope and intensity of armed conflict should be viewed
within this context: a prohibition-side expansionist view of IHL.
Would it be appropriate to apply the expansionist Tadić standard when discussing the privileges of IHL? At least some scholars more interested in the prohibitions of IHL might argue that
the two different domains ought to have different presumptions: a presumption against IHL applying when discussing its
privileges, but a presumption in favor of IHL applying when
discussing its prohibitions.
But the two sides of the IHL coin cannot be so easily disentangled from each other. Each side represents a symmetrical
relation of the consequences triggered by the existence of a special legal regime. True, a different presumption might be warranted with regard to particular facts that are of great importance to IHL. For example, it is certainly true that there is a
presumption in favor of civilian status within the context of
targeting; a soldier in doubt should presume that a target is ci101
vilian rather than a combatant. The opposite factual presumption might apply when dealing with the prohibitions of
IHL; soldiers should presume that captured individuals are en102
titled to POW status if their status is uncertain. So the presumption regarding civilian status would be opposite depending on whether one was discussing the privileges or
prohibitions of IHL. But the presumption of civilian status is
far different from the existence of armed conflict. The former
fact triggers certain rules within IHL, but the latter fact trig103
gers the entire application of IHL as a body of law. The existence of an armed conflict (and what counts as an armed conflict) is fundamentally a legal standard, and is either satisfied
104
or not. One cannot change the standard itself depending on
deviation from its standards to the maximum extent possible.” (emphasis added)).
101. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 50, 1125 U.N.T.S. at
26 (giving the definition of “civilians” and “civilian population”). For a discussion, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Killing in the Fog of War, 86 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (discussing the difficulties of determining civilian or combatant statuses in modern armed conflict).
102. Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 44, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 23–24
(giving the definition and protections of “prisoner of war” status).
103. See id. pmbl., 1125 U.N.T.S. at 6–7 (explaining how the Additional
Protocol was drafted in order to protect the victims of “armed conflicts”).
104. For example, the First Geneva Convention applies to “all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties, even if the state of war is not recognized
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whether one is discussing the privileges or prohibitions of IHL,
so as to engineer ad hoc results.
II. THE CO-APPLICATION DOCTRINE AND THE
VARIETIES OF NECESSITY
Until this point in the analysis, we have assumed that the
application of IHL would prevent the duty to capture from ap105
plying. However, there is another possible route that would
result in the application of the duty to capture, even if IHL is
triggered by the existence of an armed conflict against a sufficiently organized non-state actor. Under this route, both IHL
and IHRL would apply at the same time. Co-application of the
two normative regimes is only possible if one rejects IHL as a
lex specialis regime that knocks out other legal rules from ap106
plication. If IHL is not a lex specialis, this opens the door to
apply the rules of IHRL in two manners: first, when there is no
IHL rule on point; and second, when the governing IHL rule
has little content and can be interpreted in light of a relevant
IHRL rule. In either situation, co-application of IHL and IHRL
functions as a gap-filling exercise, plugging the holes left by the
skeletal nature of IHL. The need to fill gaps is allegedly especially acute in NIACs, which have comparatively fewer codified
rules as compared against their international cousins (IACs),
which are well regulated by Geneva and Hague Conventions
107
and other treaty regimes.
With regard to the duty to capture, the leading precedent
applying the co-application methodology is the Israeli Targeted
by one of them.” See First Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 2, 75
U.N.T.S. at 32.
105. But see NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 91–
139 (2009) (exploring the right to life under different courts and jurisdictions);
Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN
L. 3, 47 n.195 (2010) (concluding that even assuming IHL requires capture if
feasible, the killing of al-Awlaki was lawful because capture was not practicable in his case).
106. See Paust, supra note 54, at 274 n.94 (2009) (referring to lex specialis
as “Latinized nonsense,” and concluding that “I know of no relevant human
right that would needlessly inhibit lawful conduct on the battlefield”). The text
of the maxim is lex specialis derogat legi generali.
107. See, e.g., MARKO MILANOVIĆ, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 43 (2011) (discussing the Tadić case, and noting
that the court had to have recourse in the general rules of state responsibility,
“since the rules of international humanitarian law did not provide an answer”).
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108

Killings decision. In that case, Justice Barak argued that the
principle of proportionality demanded that a targetable terrorist—as a civilian directly participating in hostilities—should be
109
killed only if a “less harmful means” could not be employed.
Although the source of this exact interpretation of the principle
of proportionality was listed as a domestic (Israeli) source of
110
law, it was also referred to as a “human right.” This phrase,
coupled with the fact that the principle of proportionality clearly exists under customary international law, suggested to some
111
that the analysis would be the same under international law.
The court concluded that “if a terrorist taking a direct part in
hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are
the means which should be employed” because a “rule-of-law
state employs, to the extent possible, procedures of law and not
112
procedures of force.”
When the ICRC issued its Interpretative Guidance on the
Notion of Directly Participating in Hostilities, it too recognized
a qualitative duty to capture in Chapter IX of its document,
113
though it purported to do so solely on the basis of IHL. A cen108. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 53(4)
PD 459 [2006] (Isr.).
109. Id. ¶ 40.
110. Id.
111. See Marko Milanović, Norm Conflicts, International Humanitarian
Law, and Human Rights Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 120 (Orna Ben-Naftali ed., 2011) (noting
that although it was “not entirely clear whether the Court derived this rule
from IHRL or from domestic constitutional law, but it is clear that it is a human rights norm that it was applying”).
112. HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 53(4)
PD 459 [2005] (Isr.), ¶ 40; see also id. (citing McCann v. United Kingdom, 21
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 91 (1995)) (“[T]he use of lethal force would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether deliberately or
through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the deprivation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk.”). However, McCann is a problematic precedent for this point of law. See also
Amichai Cohen & Yuval Shany, A Development of Modest Proportions: The
Application of the Principle of Proportionality in the Targeted Killings Case, 5
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 310, 314 (2007) (“While it is hard to contest that
the McCann formula should govern the conduct of law-enforcement agencies
under human rights law in times of peace, its full application to situations of
armed conflict is questionable.”).
113. See NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 82 (2009) [hereinafter ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE] (“In such situations, the principles of military necessity and
of humanity play an important role in determining the kind and degree of
permissible force against legitimate military targets.”).
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tral element of its argument stemmed from the nature of IHL’s
withdrawal of protection from attack for civilians directly par114
ticipating in hostilities. Suggesting that this withdrawal of
protection did not make such civilians always targetable, the
report was a bit vague as to whether this placed civilians directly participating in hostilities in a liminal category between
combatants and protected civilians, or whether the asserted restrictions regarding attacks against civilian directly participating in hostilities were applicable to attacks against combatants
115
as well.
The basis for the view that civilians directly participating
in hostilities could not be targeted without restriction stemmed
from its understanding of the principle of military necessity—
116
one of the key building blocks of IHL. The report correctly
identified the principle as permitting “only that degree and
kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the legitimate purpose
of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum ex117
penditure of life and resources.” The question is how one
moves from this general principle to the conclusion that a duty
118
to capture is required. The only way to answer this question
is to provide an account of what the phrase “military necessity”
means and what the principle permits and demands from attacking forces.
A. THE HISTORY OF MILITARY NECESSITY
The ICRC definition of military necessity harkens back to
the principle’s earliest codification in Article 14 of the Lieber
Code: “Military necessity, as understood by modern civilized
114. Id. at 70.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 78; see also William Gerald Downey, Jr., The Law of War and
Military Necessity, 47 AM. J. INT’L L. 251, 252 (1953) (“One of the most important concepts in the law of war is that of military necessity, but there is no
concept more elusive.”).
117. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 79 (quoting UNITED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT § 2.2 (2004)).
118. Compare Chesney, supra note 105, at 46 (correctly concluding that the
ICRC’s position, and Melzer’s argument, rests almost exclusively on its interpretation of the principle of necessity and its logical culmination in the principle of humanity), with MELZER, supra note 105, at 290–91 (referring to the
concept of maux superﬂus as a preexisting principle that supports his interpretation of the principle of necessity).
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nations, consists in the necessity of those measures which are
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are
119
lawful according to the modern law and usages of war.” Although the Lieber Code does not provide a complete account of
military necessity, it does explain in more detail what it does
and does not allow, fleshing out the principle via family resemblance. Regarding permissions, it famously states that
[m]ilitary necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of
armed enemies, and of other persons whose destruction is incidentally
unavoidable in the armed contests of the war; it allows of the capturing of every armed enemy, and every enemy of importance to the hostile government, or of peculiar danger to the captor; it allows of all destruction of property, and obstruction of the ways and channels of
traffic, travel, or communication, and of all withholding of sustenance
or means of life from the enemy; of the appropriation of whatever an
enemy’s country affords necessary for the subsistence and safety of
the army, and of such deception as does not involve the breaking of
good faith either positively pledged, regarding agreements entered into during the war, or supposed by the modern law of war to exist. Men
who take up arms against one another in public war do not cease on
this account to be moral beings, responsible to one another and to
120
God.

What then does military necessity not allow? The Lieber
Code is clear on this as well, stating:
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is, the infliction of
suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge, nor of maiming or
wounding except in fight, nor of torture to extort confessions. It does
not admit of the use of poison in any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy;
and, in general, military necessity does not include any act of hostility
121
which makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.

In other words, the principle of military necessity prohibits acts
that are gratuitous or superfluous in the sense that they do not
confer a military advantage—i.e., they are based in pure cruel122
ty without practical advantage. And clearly, killing enemy
troops confers a large practical advantage insofar as it
achieves, in the words of Article 14, “the legitimate purpose of
the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the
enemy at the earliest possible moment with the minimum ex-

119. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 14.
120. Id. art. 15.
121. Id. art. 16.
122. Gabriella Blum suggests that burgeoning domestic support for the war
effort (by reporting high casualties of enemy troops) is not a legitimate military advantage for purposes of military necessity. Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEG. ANALYSIS 115, 142–43 (2010).
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123

penditure of life and resources.” The mirror image of the
principle of necessity is the principle of humanity, which restricts “suffering, injury or destruction not actually necessary
124
for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.”
In applying these basic principles to particular situations,
the ICRC report concludes that in conflicts between large wellequipped armies, it will rarely prohibit any particular method
of attack that is not already prohibited by a more specific rule
125
of IHL. However, in more asymmetrical conflicts like noninternational armed conflicts, the Interpretative Guidance concludes that the principles would yield substantive restrictions.
It offers the following hypothetical:
For example, an unarmed civilian sitting in a restaurant using a radio or mobile phone to transmit tactical targeting intelligence to an
attacking air force would probably have to be regarded as directly
participating in hostilities. Should the restaurant in question be situated within an area firmly controlled by the opposing party, however,
it may be possible to neutralize the military threat posed by that civilian through capture or other non-lethal means without additional risk
126
to the operating forces or the surrounding civilian population.

Strangely, the conclusion stands in stark contrast with the
basic definition of the principle of military necessity offered at
the beginning of Section IX of the Interpretive Guidance: military necessity only prohibits actions that do not advance “the
complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest pos127
sible moment.” If this were the sole criterion, then perhaps
the killing of an enemy terrorist who is lawfully targetable under IHL would not result in the submission of the enemy at an
earlier moment than would his arrest and trial, because both
killing and capture immobilize the threat. However, there is a
second part to military necessity under both Lieber’s formulation and the ICRC formulation, the “minimum expenditure of
128
life and resources” of the attacking force. Under this prong,
the attempt to capture will inevitably result in a risk of greater
123. UNITED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note 117, § 2.2.
124. PRACTICE RELATING TO RULE 14, PROPORTIONALITY IN ATTACK,
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_cou_us_rule14
(quoting U.S. DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE, PAMPHLET 110-31: THE CONDUCT OF
ARMED CONFLICT AND AIR OPERATIONS §§ 1–3 (1976)).
125. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 80.
126. Id. at 81.
127. Id. at 79 (citing UNITED KINGDOM: MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, supra note
117, § 2.2).
128. Id; see also Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 15 (addressing military
necessity in regards to the “unavoidable” destruction of persons).
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damage to the assaulting force and will offend the necessity
principle’s caveat that the assaulting force is permitted to
achieve legitimate war aims “with the minimum expenditure of
129
life and resources.” Consequently, risking any number of lives
in an attempt to capture offends this principle as written. Indeed, even offering the opportunity to surrender might run
afoul of this provision in certain circumstances, because it either eliminates the element of surprise or delays legitimate vic130
tory, or both. The ICRC report offers little to explain why the
principles of necessity and humanity would require capture, except for the conclusory statement that “it would defy basic notions of humanity to kill an adversary or to refrain from giving
131
him or her an opportunity to surrender . . . .”
We are left then with a startling disconnect between the
ICRC’s formulation of the principle of military necessity and its
132
application with regard to capture. Given the principle of necessity’s codified birth in the Lieber Code, proponents who argue that the principle means something more—a duty to pursue the least-harmful means—are insensitive to the historical
133
context in which Lieber codified the principle. As John Witt
makes clear in his recent historical study of Lieber:
Here then was a compelling but potentially ferocious framework for
the laws of war. Outside of torture, virtually all destruction seemed
permissible so long as it was necessary to advance a legitimate war
effort. The law thus permitted the use of any weapon, including
“those arms that do the quickest mischief in the widest range and in
the surest manner.” And it did so for a simple reason. As Lieber said
more than once in the course of his lectures, short wars were more
humane wars, and the way to ensure short wars was to fight them as
fiercely as possible. The prospect of fierce wars might even prevent
war from breaking out in the first place. It was thus critical that
statesmen “not allow sentimentality to sway us in war,” he warned.
“The more earnestly and keenly wars are carried on, the better for
134
humanity, for peace and civilization.”
129. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 79.
130. Indeed, Lieber explicitly recognized the importance of surprise. See
Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 19 (“Surprise may be a necessity.”).
131. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 82.
132. For an extensive critique, see W. Hays Parks, Part IX of the ICRC “Direct Participation in Hostilities” Study: No Mandate, No Expertise, and Legally
Incorrect, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 769, 805 (2010) (“The ICRC errs in its
attempt to apply an inaccurate law enforcement paradigm in armed conflict.”).
133. Indeed, the ICRC Interpretive Guidance concedes that military necessity is “strongly influenced” by the Lieber Code but includes no historical
analysis of the development of the principle. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE,
supra note 113, at 79 n.215.
134. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE 184 (2012).
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This did not mean that there were no restrictions on warfare,
however. Some prohibitions were categorical, regardless of
135
whether necessity demanded it. The use of torture was cate136
gorically impermissible, as was the use of poison and perfidy.
And today, the execution of captured POWs—even if taken during a reprisal to punish and induce a recalcitrant enemy to
obey the laws of war—is impermissible under any situation (a
categorical prohibition that emerged long after Lieber and was
137
only recently codified). But this just shows how little of the
argumentative work is performed by the principle of necessity;
the real prohibitory work in IHL is done by the specific prohibitions regarding outlawed methods of warfare, not the general
principle of necessity, which allows prosecution of the war ef138
fort with maximum speed.
As far as the general principle goes, what is outlawed by
the principle of necessity is death and destruction not related to
the war effort—actions performed purely out of cruelty, avarice,
139
revenge, madness or nihilism, one would suppose. A rational
actor has little reason to pursue such actions anyway, unless
overcome by emotion, since they are not related to the war ef140
fort. But the principle of necessity under IHL does not mean
that the attacking force needs to sacrifice more in order to com141
ply with the principle. As Witt points out, Lieber wrote in an
135. See GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HULAW IN WAR 260 (2010) (noting the situations which Lieber considered to be impermissible in war).
136. See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 16.
137. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20, 1125 U.N.T.S. at
11–12, 15; Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615.
But see Michael N. Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International
Humanitarian Law: Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 795,
820–21 (2010) (citing the ICTY case, Krupreskic, which notes the “prohibition
on belligerent reprisals against civilians that appears in Additional Protocol I
had become customary” however, the author later indicates the United States
and the United Kingdom consider these reprisals of military necessity under
certain circumstances).
138. In his illuminating book, Witt argues that the Emancipation Proclamation was a war measure justified on the basis of military necessity—hence
the greater social impact of Lieber’s principle of necessity. See WITT, supra
note 134, at 234.
139. See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 11 (stating that military necessity
disclaims “all cruelty and bad faith . . . [;] all extortions and other transactions
for individual gain; all acts of private revenge”).
140. See, e.g., WITT, supra note 134, at 184 (noting that Lieber believed
that a brief and focused war effort is the best means of accomplishing military
victory).
141. See Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 292 (referring as “revisionism” any
MANITARIAN
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unfinished book that attacks were “lawful only as a means to
obtain the great end for which a war is undertaken, and not for
its own sake” and that this represented “the chief difference between the wars of barbarous ages and the armed contests of
142
civilized people.” Witt concludes that, “[i]n Lieber’s hands,
military necessity was both a broad limit on war’s violence and
143
a robust license to destroy.” Simply put, Lieber was not in favor of over-regulating warfare, because making wars too civilized would inevitably prolong them, potentially increasing the
144
overall suffering.
B. THE MODERN NOTION OF MILITARY NECESSITY
One might object that IHL has moved beyond the Lieber
Code, and that many of the customs of war permitted in
Lieber’s time have long since been outlawed by treaty or custom in the current post-World-War-II era of IHL. While this is
true—the Lieber Code was undoubtedly replaced by more mod145
ern codifications —the question is more properly whether the
principle of necessity has undergone a similar transformation.
But based on the particular codification of the principle of necessity that one hears most often, and that has been adopted by
the ICRC, it is clear that the principle of necessity has largely
interpretation of the necessity principle that requires capture before killing);
cf. Blum, supra note 122, at 73 (arguing that the duty to capture based on military necessity could be enshrined as a legal obligation through amendment
and supporting, like Melzer, a least-harmful-means test as a gloss on military
necessity). However, Blum also has an innovative argument based on the
principle of distinction. See id. at 127–31. Just as IHL requires attacking forces to use technology to distinguish between combatants and civilians, the
same technology might be used to distinguish further within the category of
combatants between threatening combatants and non-threatening combatants. See id. at 120, 154–60. However, Blum fails to contend with the fact that
the very concept of combatancy within IHL is based on the notion that all
combatants are by definition threatening, hence their targetability based on
status. See id. at 126 (conceding that IHL presumes that all soldiers are “seeking to kill”). To talk of “nonthreatening” combatants is a contradiction in terms
unless one introduces a temporal element, i.e., the combatant is not threatening at a discrete moment in time because he is sleeping or otherwise disengaged from direct fighting. See id. at 157–60.
142. See WITT, supra note 134, at 234. Witt refers to this as Lieber’s
“Clausewitzian perspective” on war (violence rationally related to the political
objectives of the state). Id. at 236.
143. Id. at 234.
144. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 29 (“Sharp wars are brief.”).
145. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20, 1125
U.N.T.S. at 11–12, 15; Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 12, 75
U.N.T.S. at 146.
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146

remained unchanged since Lieber. Rather, it is the specific
147
prohibitions that have changed in IHL. Indeed, one of the
reasons why the specific rules on prohibited methods were
adopted within the last fifty years is precisely because the prin148
ciple of necessity—by itself—was ill-suited to the task. Since
military necessity means—and has always meant—that the attack is legitimately related to the expeditious pursuit of war
aims with minimal risk of life and limb to the attacker, there is
no possible way that the concept of military necessity could perform the wide-ranging normative work that some human-rights
149
lawyers today have ascribed to it. The concept is simply inca150
pable of carrying that heavy a load in the argument.
The more modern precedents support and extend this reading of military necessity as being essentially unchanged since
the time of Lieber. In the Hostage Case, the U.S. Military Tribunal sitting in Nuremberg concluded that “[m]ilitary necessity
permits a belligerent, subject to the laws of war, to apply any
amount and kind of force to compel the complete submission of
the enemy with the least expenditure of time, life, and mon151
ey.” This formulation closely matches Lieber’s formulation in146. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 54(5), 1125 U.N.T.S. at
27.
147. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, arts. 11, 20 1125
U.N.T.S. at 11–12, 15; Geneva Conventions, supra note 14, art. 13, 75
U.N.T.S. at 146.
148. See Luban, supra note 92, at 25 (noting that human rights advocates
believe that humanitarian treaties were created “to break with the horrifying
past”).
149. See Luban, supra note 92, at 11–22 (describing the “Laws of Armed
Conflict” approach to the laws of war wherein military necessity prevails over
broader humanitarian concerns); see also Declaration Renouncing the Use, in
Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29,
1868, [hereinafter St. Petersburg Declaration] available at http://www
.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/130 (only legitimate war aim is “to weaken the military
forces of the enemy; [t]hat for this purpose it is sufﬁcient to disable the greatest possible number of men”).
150. But see Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War:
The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT’L L.
213, 231 (1998) (“Today, military necessity is widely regarded as something
that must be overcome or ignored if international humanitarian law is to develop, and its original role as a limit on military action has been forgotten. As
a result, the principle has not been applied in new situations where it could
serve as a significant legal restraint until more specific treaty rules or customs
are established.”). Carnahan argues that the principle of military necessity
has chastised military conduct, citing as examples the reluctance to bomb food
crops during the Korean Conflict. See id. at 229.
151. United States v. List (The Hostage Case), Case No. 7 (Feb. 19, 1948),
reprinted in 11 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY
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sofar as it permits an unrestricted amount of force as long as it
is rationally related to defeating the enemy, unless prohibited
by a more specific rule. David Luban is correct when he concludes that the Hostage formulation of military necessity “includes any lawful act that saves a dollar or a day in the pursuit
152
of military victory.” Some scholars are critical of such formulations on normative grounds because they do not require an
attacker to give up even a trivial amount of marginal risk to
their own troops in order to reduce the amount of casualties to
153
the opposing force. However, this just highlights the previous
point: that military necessity tracks the licensing function of
IHL more than it tracks the regulating function of IHL, the lat154
ter being carried by more specific prohibitory rules. As explained in Part I, IHL involves two functions: it licenses the
privilege of combatancy, permitting killing that would otherwise be illegal, and it then places constraints on that license, by
155
virtue of specific prohibitions regarding methods and tactics.
Though it straddles both domains, the concept of military necessity belongs far more to the former than the latter.
The first question is what is meant by the term “indispensable” with regard to defining necessary actions as those that
are indispensable for securing the ends of the war. First, if one
reads only Article 14 of the Lieber Code, one might be left with
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 1230, 1253 (2007); see
also Luban, supra note 92, at 43 (referring to this as the Hostages formulation
of military necessity). For a discussion of this standard in relation to the entire
List case, see KEVIN JON HELLER, THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND
THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2011).
152. Luban, supra note 92, at 44. However, Luban views the Hostage formulation as a substantial expansion of Lieber’s original formulation, mostly
because Luban focuses exclusively on Article 14 of the Lieber Code (defining
military necessity in relation to actions that are “indispensable” to the war
aims) but downplays Article 15 (“Military necessity admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies”) as well as the historical context,
including the state practice and opinio juris, of Lieber’s Code. Compare id. at
44–46, with Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 14, 15. In fact, a complete reading
of Lieber’s notion of military necessity is impossible without considering in toto everything from Article 14 through Article 29 (“The more vigorously wars
are pursued, the better it is for humanity. Sharp wars are brief.”). See id. art.
14–29.
153. See Blum, supra note 122, at 124 (noting that necessity “justiﬁes not
only what is required to win the war, but also what reduces the risks of losses
or costs of the war”); Seth Lazar, Necessity in Self-Defense and War, 40 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 3, 39–42 (2012) (formulating necessity in terms of marginal risk).
154. But see Luban, supra note 92, at 40 (arguing that “necessity serves
both a prohibitive and licensing function”).
155. See Blum, supra note 122, at 123.
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the perception that “indispensable” means “left with no other
156
choice.” But it certainly did not mean that for Lieber, as Arti157
cles 15 through 20 of the Lieber Code make clear. A holistic
reading of the entire first section of the Lieber Code makes
clear that necessity allows not only the wholesale destruction of
158
life and limb but also anything non-gratuitous. Second, contemporary IHL commentators sensitive to this nuance understand “indispensable” in similar fashion, as proportionately re159
lated to prompt resolution of the war effort. Provisions in the
Additional Protocols also evidence this prohibition against su160
perfluous suffering.
One way of giving content to the notion of causing super161
fluous suffering is to think of marginal risk. If the law were
to impose a duty to capture, the burden imposed on the attacking party would take the form of additional risk; troops would
be placed at risk that they would not otherwise suffer if they
156. See Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 14.
157. See WITT, supra note 134, at 235 (“These were the key words: Indispensable for securing the ends of the war. . . . But what did [indispensable]
mean? One thing was certain. It did not mean that armies were permitted to
take only those actions that were necessary in the sense of leaving no other
choice. Read this way, the necessity principle would have prohibited virtually
every act of war, for it was rarely the case that any course of conduct (in war
or otherwise) offered the only available path forward.”); see also Lieber Code,
supra note 14, art. 14–20.
158. Hays Parks, a member of the ICRC Direct Participation Working
Group, also notes that the ICRC Interpretive Guidance fails to cite Article 15
and ignores its “life and limb” language, thus leading to its erroneous interpretation and application of military necessity. See Parks, supra note 132, at 805.
159. See, e.g., MICHAEL BOTHE, KARL JOSEF PARTSCH & WALDEMAR A.
SOLF, NEW RULES FOR VICTIMS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 194 (1982) (allowing
relevant and proportionate action); MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P.
FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 521–22 (1961) (equating Lieber’s “indispensable” with “relevant and proportionate”).
160. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 35(2), 1125 U.N.T.S.
at 21 (“It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.”). For an example, see Downey, supra note 116, at 261 (discussing regulated weapon systems such as explosive bullets that aggravate “the recipient
without furthering the military purpose of the projectile”); see also Robert D.
Sloane, On the Use and Abuse of Necessity in the Law of State Responsibility,
106 AM. J. INT’L L. 447, 486–87 (2012); cf. JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND
PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 75 (1985) (noting change
from “superfluous injury” to “unnecessary suffering”).
161. For a discussion of marginal risk in this context, see Lazar, supra note
153, at 13. However, Lazar’s analysis of necessity is more applicable for selfdefense since his formulations all assume the wrongfulness of one side of the
conflict—an assumption that is entirely inconsistent with contemporary jus in
bello built around the equality of combatants.
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simply killed the target. Military necessity therefore insists on
a form of Pareto optimality in which there is no Pareto-superior
move that makes one side better off without making the other
side worse off. Foregoing the use of lethal force (and using capture instead) would definitely benefit the target, but this advantage could only be secured by making the attacking side
worse off (through the risk to its troops). Since there will always be risk associated with capture instead of kill (with the
exception of enemy troops who have already surrendered and
laid down their weapons), requiring capture would not be a Pareto-superior move. Consequently, Pareto optimality is reached
at a rather low level in the necessity of armed conflict, since
additional risk is always a potential burden for either side.
That is why IHL offers so little protection to enemy combat162
ants, other than gratuitous suffering.
Before continuing, two final objections ought to be considering: (1) whether civilians directly participating in hostilities
represent a special case that requires a duty to capture, and (2)
whether IHL’s core distinction between combatants and civilians is a crude and obsolete proxy that ought to be abandoned.
1. Capturing Civilian Combatants
Perhaps the calculation required by military necessity is
different when dealing with civilians who are subject to attack
because they are directly participating in hostilities. Under this
argument, the duty to attempt capture would not apply to regular soldiers, but would apply to civilians subject to attack. This
would lead to three categories for purposes of targeting: (1)
regular soldiers who can be attacked at any time; (2) innocent
civilians who can never be directly attacked but may suffer collateral consequences just as long as they are disproportionate
to the military objective; and, in between these two categories,
(3) civilians directly participating in hostilities who may be captured and only killed if capture is impossible.
Under IHL, the warrant for recognizing this third, liminal
category is Additional Protocol I (API). Article 57(2) of API requires the taking of “all feasible precautions in the choice of
means and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in
any event to minimizing, incidental loss or civilian life, injury

162. See id. at 41 (noting that “the interests of enemy combatants are almost wholly discounted, and additional weight is given to the interests of civilians, regardless of their afﬁliation”).
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to civilians and damage to civilian objects.” Furthermore, Article 57(3) requires that “[w]hen a choice is possible between
several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the objective to be selected shall be that the attack on
which may be expected to cause the least danger to civilian
164
lives and to civilian objects.” Finally, Article 52 provides that
civilian objects shall not be the object of attack, and that “military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture
or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, of165
fers a definite military advantage.” When combined together,
these provisions might be interpreted to require attacking forces to take greater precautions to prevent harm to civilians directly participating in hostilities, killing them only if capture is
impossible.
163. Additional Protocol I, supra note 14, art. 57(2), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
164. Id. art. 57(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. at 29.
165. Id. art. 52, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 27. Melzer concludes that Article 52 embodies Pictet’s “use of force continuum” which requires that modest levels of
force be contemplated before resorting to lethal force. See MELZER, supra note
105, at 289 (“If we can put a soldier out of action by capturing him, we should
not wound him; if we can obtain the same result by wounding him, we must
not kill him. If there are two means to achieve the same military advantage,
we must choose the one which causes the lesser evil.” (quoting PICTET, supra
note 160, at 75–76)). The same Pictet quote is also cited in the ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 82 n.221, for the ICRC’s conclusion
that “the principles of military necessity and of humanity play an important
role in determining the kind and degree of permissible force against legitimate
military targets.” Id. at 84. Hays Parks mocks the ICRC’s description of the
Pictet quote as “famous” and concludes that it is neither famous nor correct, is
mere lex ferenda, and contrary to both state practice and opinio juris. See
Parks, supra note 132, at 786 n.59, 815 n.125. Parks also argues that Article
52 of API deals with civilian “objects,” not civilian personnel or civilians proper. See id. at 796; see also Blum, supra note 122, at 127–30 (noting different
standards for civilian personnel and civilian objects). But see Ryan Goodman,
The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EURO. J. INT’L L. (manuscript at 33–34) (forthcoming 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
2213960 (concluding that Pictet’s views were supported at the relevant meetings by several scholars including Hans Blix). However, Goodman points to no
specific provision of the Additional Protocol that codified this view other than
the article 35 prohibition against “superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering,” a phrase that makes no reference to killing per se. See Jens David Ohlin,
The Capture-Kill Debate: Lost Legislative History or Revisionist History? 12–
13 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author), available at http://ssrn
.com/abstract=2230486; Kevin Jon Heller, A Response to Goodman About the
(Supposed) Duty to Capture, OPINIO JURIS (Mar. 13, 2013, 7:15 AM ), http://
opiniojuris.org/2013/03/13/a-response-to-goodman-about-the-supposed-duty-to
-capture/.
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This view is problematic for several reasons. It misconstrues API, which is designed to generally limit the suffering of
innocent civilians, and specifically to augment the pre-API prohibition against causing disproportionate damage with the
added requirement to take all feasible precautions to reduce civilian damage, even below the threshold of mere proportionality. To reread these protections so as to require the capture of
civilians directly participating in hostilities has perverse consequences. It would essentially discourage individuals from complying with the laws of war, because individuals who want to
fight but refuse to don a uniform or carry arms openly would
gain protections that far outstrip the protections that regular
combatants are afforded. They would be entitled to be treated
as civilians for purposes of API calculations with regard to “feasible precautions,” while regular combatants complying with
the laws of war would still be subject to wholesale attack. That
cannot be the purpose of API.
The correct view is to think of civilians directly participating in hostilities as functionally equivalent to regular combatants for purposes of targeting; they are subject to the same reciprocal risk of killing by virtue of their self-insertion into the
armed conflict. No special duty to capture applies to them, because in a sense they are civilians in name only; they become
functional combatants. The only difference between civilians
directly participating in hostilities and regular combatants is
that the former category includes a transitory and temporal element, while the latter does not. Regular combatants are always subject to killing, whereas civilians directly participating
in hostilities are only targetable “during such time” as they
participate in hostilities; but this fact alone does not entail that
their targeting status demands that they be treated like inno167
cent civilians.
2. The Proxy and Convention Arguments
The current IHL rules, and in particular the interplay between the principles of distinction and necessity, are subject to

166. See, e.g., Milanović, supra note 111, at 121 n.108 (calling this view
“unconvincing”).
167. The one exception is civilians who exercise a continuous combat function in a non-state armed group, who are targetable at any time in analogous
fashion to regular combatants. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note
113, at 33–34.

2013]

DUTY TO CAPTURE

1309
168

criticism for being both under-inclusive and over-inclusive.
The concept of distinction requires that civilians be protected,
and the concept of military necessity allows all combatants to
169
be targeted and killed. On a moral level, this scheme assumes
that the categories of civilian and combatant track the morally
relevant distinctions, such as threat level and dangerousness,
such that combatants are dangerous and civilians are not. But
these legal categories are crude proxies at best—usually matching the underlying moral reality but at the margins departing
from them substantially. In that vein, it is possible to consider
a combatant who is neither threatening nor dangerous, either
because he is asleep or because he works at a non-combat function such as cooking or cleaning (because he is a private and also behind the front lines). As a corollary, consider the wellknown example of the civilian working in the munitions facto170
ry. The first is arguably not a threat but still targetable anyway; the second is making a significant contribution to the war
effort but not targetable (depending on one’s definition of “participating” in hostilities). Do these counterexamples suggest
that the key legal categories of IHL—civilians and combat171
ants—are antiquated or obsolete?
Proxies are everywhere in the law and the mere existence
of a proxy is not by itself a sufficient argument for its elimination. Proxies provide clarity, systematicity, and promote publicity—all essential qualities for a field like IHL that must be selfadministered and self-enforced by the parties of an armed conflict. The question is whether the benefits of the proxy in this
case outweigh its lack of precision at the margins; in other
words, whether the IHL distinction between combatants and
civilians is a crude proxy or a successful one. There are several
points to be made here. First, the alleged under-inclusiveness
168. Criticisms in this vein are found in a number of materials. See LARRY
MAY, WAR CRIMES AND JUST WAR 112–17 (2007) (critiquing value of social
categories to guide decision-making during war); Blum, supra note 122, at
138–39 (summarizing the status-based distinction criticism).
169. See Blum, supra note 122, at 127–30 (summarizing the effect of distinction on civilians and combatants).
170. See id. at 139; cf. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, PRESENTATION:
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 6-3 (2002), available
at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/law3_final.pdf (concluding that
civilians “run a risk” by working in a munitions factory, though apparently
concluding that the munitions are directly targetable while the civilian employees are collateral damage subject to the rule of proportionality).
171. For this reason, Van Schaack views these arguments as revisionist
and not sounding in lex lata. Van Schaack, supra note 11, at 292–93.
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of the rule is contestable, since there is a colorable argument
that the munitions worker and the bomb maker (of say alQaeda) are directly participating in hostilities by virtue of their
172
craftsmanship in the tools of warfare. This leaves the problem of over-inclusiveness stemming from the sleeping soldier or
the proverbial army cook. In both situations, the argument for
their lack of dangerousness stems entirely from a temporal dimension; the individuals may be dangerous in past or future
(with different assignments) but they are not dangerous right
now, and thus their targeting is morally problematic.
So the key to the objection is really status-based targeting
itself, as opposed to conduct-based targeting, which will more
closely track the temporal element of dangerousness. So the
central question is thought to be: is the combatant doing anything at this moment in time that makes him dangerous
enough to be targeted?
Once the real basis of this objection is revealed, it is clear
why it must be rejected. The very notion of status-based targeting is carefully woven into the very fabric of IHL because
armed conflict is a collective enterprise. Conduct-based targeting is entirely appropriate for the law of individual selfdefense, where both private citizens and police exercising lawful force must demonstrate that the target posed an immediate
173
risk based on his or her conduct. But armed conflict is a collective endeavor between groups, whether nation-states or nonstate actors. During wartime, individuals are placed at war
simply by virtue of their citizenship or membership in one of
the warring parties, making each of them responsible for the
174
actions of the whole. During wartime, individuals are placed
at war simply by virtue of their citizenship or membership in
one of the warring parties, making each of them responsible for
175
the actions of the whole. This is the essence of Lieber’s famous phrase that “men live in political, continuous societies,
172. For a discussion of the targetability of bomb-makers, see Amos
Guiora, The Importance of Criteria-Based Reasoning in Targeted Killing Decisions, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW & MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD
303, 322–24 (Claire Finkelstein, Jens David Ohlin, & Andrew Altman eds.,
2012).
173. Both the legal system and moral philosophy require the same question
in this scenario.
174. Accord Eyal Benvenisti, Human Dignity in Combat: The Duty to Spare
Enemy Civilians, 39 ISR. L. REV. 81, 88 (2006).
175. Contra id. at 86 (asserting that civilians should not bear the consequences of combat with which they are not associated).

2013]

DUTY TO CAPTURE

1311

forming organized units, called states or nations, whose constituents bear, enjoy, suffer, advance and retrograde together,
176
in peace and in war.” To transform IHL targeting to an entirely conduct-based system is to cling to the fiction that we can
pursue war as atomic individuals.
177
For moral individualists, this would be a virtue. Moral
individualists deny that collectives are relevant during wartime; they claim that the same rules of self-defense ought to
178
apply in war as they do in peacetime. One aspect of moral individualism is that killing an enemy soldier depends on wheth179
er the enemy is pursuing a just war or not. Under this theory,
killing a Nazi soldier would have been morally permissible because the Nazi Army was engaged in genocide and aggression,
while killing an American soldier would have been morally
wrong because the Americans were engaged in a just cause in
fighting the Nazis. This philosophical view yields completely
different answers from the law of war and its canonical separa180
tion of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. For the most ambitious
moral individualists, this disconnect is reason enough to completely reengineer the law of war and transform its cardinal
181
principles.
A full-blown attack on moral individualism is far beyond
182
the scope of this Article. The modest point here is simply to
connect the proposal to move IHL towards conduct-based targeting with the philosophical position of moral individualism.
The argument behind conduct-based revisionism in targeting is
176. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 20.
177. See generally Jeff McMahan, Collectivist Defenses of the Moral Equality of Combatants, 6 J. MILITARY ETHICS 50 (2007) (espousing a more individualist perspective and arguing that the collectivist understanding of war fails).
178. See, e.g., JEFF MCMAHAN, KILLING IN WAR 84, 156 (2009).
179. See, e.g., id. at 36–37.
180. Incidentally, though the legal separation of in bello and ad bellum is
canonical, scholars have recently asserted that the terms are of modern vintage. See Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 28, at 8; Robert Kolb,
Origin of the Twin Terms jus ad bellum/jus in bello, 79 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
553, 553–55 (1997).
181. See MCMAHAN, supra note 178, at 2–7.
182. For a defense of moral collectivism, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS
DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY 177–214 (2008); George P. Fletcher, The
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective
Guilt, 111 YALE L.J. 1499, 1513–26 (2002); cf. Christopher Kutz, The Difference Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal Law and War, 33 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 148, 153–80 (2005) (examining the themes of “collective inculpation
and collective exculpation” and their impact in the treatment of irregular, nonuniformed combatants); Lazar, supra note 153, at 23–29.
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that it produces more accurate results regarding targeting (as
opposed to over-inclusive results). Accuracy, however, is pegged
to the dangerousness of the individual, a standard that reigns
in individual self-defense cases in domestic criminal law. This
assumes that targeting is inappropriate because an individual
belongs to an organized group (whether a state or a non-state
group) that collectively threatens another state who must respond with collective force of its own.
One might object that collectivism of this sort entails total
wars fought against civilian populations just as much as
against combatants, since civilians are members of the nation
that ought to “advance and retrograde” together, as Lieber
183
says. If this disreputable result is the direct consequence of
collectivism, then collectivism must be wrong. But the objection
proves too much. Theorists have long recognized that civilians
are not morally innocent and ought to share in the burdens of
the war effort—especially unjust ones—leading to suggestions
for war reparations and other strategies to make civilian populations less likely to support or tolerate domestic governments
184
controlled by warmongers. Furthermore, IHL long ago developed conventions to limit the relevant membership for purposes
of targeting, so that membership in the nation is insufficient
but membership in the armed forces is sufficient to make an
185
individual a lawful target. This convention recognizes the inherent collectivism of armed conflict—that combatants represent a threat by virtue of their participation in a collective effort—by crafting a rule for targeting that all sides in the
conflict can and will abide by.
There might be additional arguments that could be deployed in favor of a normative position that the law of war
186
ought to recognize a duty to capture enemy soldiers. Many of
these normative arguments stem from philosophical arguments
regarding the moral value of human lives even in the case of
combatants. Perhaps it is wrong for the law of war to be so cavalier regarding the lives of combatants, especially in states that
continue to use a draft system and the line between “civilian”
183. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art 20.
184. See, e.g., MCMAHAN, supra note 178, at 203–35; Jeff McMahan, The
Just Distribution of Harm Between Combatants and Noncombatants, 38 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 342, 345 n.3 (2010).
185. See Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis,
in THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 19–21 (Dieter
Fleck ed., 2008).
186. See Blum, supra note 122, at 160–63.
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and “combatant” is only a few months in basic training. Such
arguments might represent the future trajectory of the philosophy of warfare, but their full consideration is outside the scope
of the present inquiry. Suffice it to say that the law of war has
always been conservative in its embrace of vanguard moral
theories that require revision of the laws of war. Although
change has come in some areas—outlawing reprisals is a classic example—the law of war only adopts them if there is a reasonable chance that states will actually follow these new pre187
scriptions.
While human rights law has the luxury of
codifying aspirational norms couched in universalistic terms,
the law of war is in danger of collapsing if the content of the
law runs too far ahead of the actual practice of belligerents.
Therefore, the space between lex lata and lex ferenda is zealously guarded in IHL in a way that it is not in IHRL.
C. THE DIFFERENT FLAVORS OF CO-APPLICATION
Another basis for challenging Lieber’s concept of military
necessity is to consider the question as involving both IHL and
IHRL at the same time. Under this view, the normative prescriptions of IHLR are viewed as universal and applicable in all
situations, including armed conflict. Of particular relevance are
the IHRL protections involving the right to life and the general
notion of proportionality that has swept human-rights discourse and global constitutionalism. As for the first—the right
to life—it is generally taken as axiomatic that, in the words of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR), “[e]very human being has the inherent right to life . . .
188
[that] . . . shall be protected by law.” With regard to proportionality, most European constitutional courts generally recognize that the balancing of interests implied in cases of conflict189
ing rights is to be governed by the rule of proportionality. In
187. See supra Part II.A.
188. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6 ¶ 1,
opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force, Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR].
189. For a discussion of proportionality, see generally Moshe Cohen-Eliya
& Iddo Porat, Proportionality and the Culture of Justification, 59 AM. J. COMP.
L. 463, 465 (2011) (tracing the spread of proportionality from Prussian administrative law to its later adoption by the European Court of Human Rights);
Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 72 (2008) (noting that proportionality balancing has become a dominant technique of rights adjudication, discussing its geneology, and theorizing about why it has become attractive to
judges worldwide). See also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser.
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such cases, the government can infringe the right of the individual no more than is necessary to achieve its legitimate interest; anything beyond this level would be impermissibly dis190
proportionate. Implicit in the notion of the proportionality is
the notion of necessity, in the sense that actions that are unnecessary to achieve the government interest become disproportionate and responses requiring judicial intervention on the
191
basis of human-rights law. As applied to targeted killings, the
argument would be that the inherent right to life of the individual terrorist suspects can only be infringed if it is truly necessary to achieve the government result. Since capture would
disable the foreign terrorist as much as killing him, the decision to forego capture in favor of military killing represents a
192
disproportionate response by the government.
Although this view is uncontestably the correct analysis for
situations governed wholly by human-rights law, the question
is whether a situation could be governed by both IHL and
IHRL, such that they are co-applied in the analysis, each one
enriching the other and filling in the gaps left by the other’s
193
normative regime. Given the general paucity of codified rules
governing NIACs—Common Article 3 and APII being two of the
most notable exceptions—one might look to IHRL to fill in the

A) at 24 (1981) (“On the issue of proportionality, the Court considers that such
justifications as there are for retaining the law in force unamended are outweighed by the detrimental effects . . . .”); Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 23 (1976) (explaining that penalties imposed “must be
proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued”).
190. See Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 752 (2008) (“[I]n matters ranging
from the regulation of property to constraints on human rights, the proportionality principle has emerged as ‘one of the most important principles invoked’ . . . to challenge the effect of regulations on the rights of persons.” (quoting Axel Desmedt, Proportionality in WTO Law, 4 J. INT’L ECON. L. 441, 442
(2001))); see also Mattias Kumm, Political Liberalism and the Structure of
Rights: On the Place and Limits of the Proportionality Requirement, in LAW,
RIGHTS, AND DISCOURSE: THE LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF ROBERT ALEXY 131,
136–41 (George Pavlakos ed., 2007).
191. See Isayeva v. Russia, App. No.57950/00, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 847, 883
(2005) (“Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the
achievement of the permitted aims.”).
192. See Gabor Rona, Interesting Times for International Humanitarian
Law: Challenges From the “War on Terror”, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 55,
64–65 (2003) (noting that drone attacks violate human right to life).
193. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does
International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers?, 88 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 881, 888–903 (2006).
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gaps left by IHL with regard to NIACs.
Under this coapplication approach, the concept of proportionality used by
IHRL would be imported into situations already acknowledged
195
as being governed by IHL.
It is important to distinguish between different flavors of
co-application. In the Nuclear Weapons case, the ICJ famously
concluded that the human right not to be arbitrarily deprived
of life “falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis,
namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed
196
to regulate the conduct of hostilities.” In other words, although human rights are universal and apply in some abstract
sense in every situation, including armed conflict, their content
is determined exclusively by reference to IHL, which simply is
a human rights framework for armed conflict. Consequently,
the full scope of a party’s legal obligations is determined by the
operative legal rules of IHL, not the formal rules of IHRL. This
mildest form of co-application has little or no practical consequences above an IHL-only view, because IHL remains the lex
specialis that expresses what human-rights law requires during armed conflict.
In contrast, a stronger flavor of co-application assumes
that the operation of both fields of law would have practical
consequences because the content of universal human rights
norms is not exclusively determined by the relevant rules of
197
IHL. Instead, the norms and doctrines of IHRL apply when
there is no direct IHL rule on point, and even when there is an
IHL rule on point, its interpretation is to be influenced in the
198
background by the universal IHRL norm. When there is no
direct IHL rule on point, this flavor of co-application has huge
practical consequences because it allows extraterritorial operation of an IHRL norm during an armed conflict through its gap199
filling function. And even when there is an IHL rule on point,
194. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 95–96.
195. Cf. LUBELL, supra note 54, at 236–42 (arguing that IHL proportionality would apply during full-blown armed conflicts but situations falling below
that threshold might require IHRL principles of proportionality).
196. See Nuclear Weapons, supra note 99, at 240; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 178 (July 9) (describing IHL as the lex
specialis applicable during armed conflict).
197. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 95–96.
198. See Cordula Droege, The Interplay Between International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Situations of Armed Conflict, 40 ISR. L. REV. 310, 338–40 (2007).
199. See generally Noam Lubell, Parallel Application of International Hu-
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this flavor of co-application provides a canon of interpretation
that has the potential to strongly influence the outcome of the
200
analysis, depending on the relevant norms in question.
While the co-application approach arguably fills gaps,
there are several argument to support IHL as an independent
body of law—a lex specialis—that either knocks out all other
governing legal regimes, including IHRL, or provides the decision rule for the content of human rights during situations of
201
armed conflict (as the ICJ suggested in Nuclear Weapons).
First, the basic foundational norms of the two regimes are logi202
cally incompatible. While IHRL is based on the foundational
norm that everyone has the right to life, IHL is based on the reciprocal risk of killing, or the idea that each soldier has the
right to kill other soldiers with impunity, and in so doing opens
203
himself up to a reciprocal risk of killing. In other words, a
universal right to life simply does not exist in IHL; indeed the
entire body of law is based on its rejection because IHL assumes that killing in warfare can be regulated by distinguish204
ing between lawful and unlawful targets. So the incompatibility goes straight to the core of the two fields.
manitarian Law and International Human Rights Law: An Examination of the
Debate, 40 ISR. L. REV. 648 (2007) (generally discussing co-applicability of IHL
and IHRL and highlighting some discrepancies); William A. Schabas, Lex
Specialis? Belt and Suspenders? The Parallel Operation of Human Rights Law
and the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Conundrum of Jus Ad Bellum, 40 ISR.
L. REV. 592 (2007) (arguing that IHL and IHRL are incompatible and a seamless integration of the two should not be attempted).
200. A prime example is the ECHR case involving Chechnya, which applied
human-rights law directly, in spite of the existence of an armed conflict. However, as Blum and Abresch both correctly note, neither Russia nor Turkey argued that it was derogating from human-rights law due to the existence of an
armed conflict and the triggering of IHL. It is thus unclear whether the ECHR
would render the same rulings when faced with a state, like the United States,
that insists that its actions are justified by IHL. See Isayeva v. Russia, 41 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 847, 875 (2005). See generally William Abresch, A Human Rights Law
of Internal Armed Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights in Chechnya, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 741 (2005) (analyzing ECHR application of human
rights law in Chechnya cases). Blum, supra note 122, at 132 n.39; Ergi v. Turkey, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 59 (1998) (applying human rights law).
201. See, e.g., Nuclear Weapons, supra note 99, at 240.
202. See Schabas, supra note 199, at 593–94 (arguing that there is a fundamental incompatibility between the two systems stemming from the law of
war’s separation of jus in bello and jus ad bellum, a distinction which is not
replicated in human-rights law); see, e.g., Isayeva, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 888 (referring to the “legitimate aim” of the action); Schabas, supra note 199, at 607
(noting correctly that legitimate aim is irrelevant under IHL proper).
203. See Droege, supra note 198, at 313 (discussing reciprocity).
204. See Louise Doswald-Beck, The Right to Life in Armed Conflict: Does
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One answer to this objection is that the right to life, even
in IHRL, is hardly universal. Article 6 of the ICCPR goes on to
qualify the inherent right with “[n]o one shall be arbitrarily de205
prived of his life.” Perhaps the central rule of distinction in
IHL—killing combatants and protecting civilians—is a princi206
pled rule that is hardly arbitrary. However, the concept of
“arbitrariness” in IHRL means something far more substantial
than this. In wartime, a combatant wearing a uniform is legally
targetable at almost any moment in time, with very few exceptions (when he is hors de combat, injured, or providing medical
services), including when he is asleep. These arbitrary killings
are permissible simply by virtue of the target’s enemy uniform—his status alone—yet undeniably lawful under IHL.
The potential incompatibility with the two bodies of law
has led to anxiety that their co-application will necessarily in207
volve a watering down of human-rights law. Nowhere is that
anxiety in greater display than in the right to life; in order to
reconcile itself with the central privilege of combatancy at the
core of armed conflict, IHRL must radically scale down its ambitions regarding the right to life. For some, this is a deal with
the devil that IHRL and its proponents ought to stay as far

International Humanitarian Law Provide All the Answers? 88 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 881, 882 (2006) (noting that Human Rights Courts adjudicating the
right to life must make reference solely to the Human Rights Conventions that
created these courts, partially explaining the absence of IHL from these decisions); Gloria Gaggioli & Robert Kolb, A Right to Life in Armed Conflicts? The
Contribution of the European Court of Human Rights, 37 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS
115, 134–36 (discussing the right to life in IHL); see also Noëlle Quénivet, The
Right to Life in International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, in
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: TOWARDS A
NEW MERGER IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 338–40 (Roberta Arnold & Noëlle
Quénivet eds., 2008) (discussing grounds for deciding on the justification of the
use of force in IHL); cf. Doswald-Beck, supra note 193, at 882 n.2. (noting that
one exception includes Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter-Am. Comm’n
H.R., Report No. 55/97, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 rev. 271 (1997)). But see G.I.A.D.
Draper, Human Rights and the Law of War, 12 VA J. INT’L L. 326, 338 (1972)
(concluding that Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights incorporates, by reference, all of IHL); see also Abresch, supra note 200, at 745
(“The drafters of the ECHR presumably envisioned that states involved in
armed conflicts would derogate to humanitarian law with respect to the right
to life.”).
205. ICCPR, supra note 188.
206. See Abresch, supra note 200, at 745 (“Most human rights treaties provide that the right to life is non-derogable, leaving the word ‘arbitrary’ as the
only hook for humanitarian law.”).
207. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 97.
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208

away from as possible. As Milanović puts the point sharply,
“[F]or all its humanitarian ethos, IHL is still a discipline about
209
killing people, albeit in a civilized sort of way.”
A good example of the incompatibility of the two normative
regimes is McCann v. United Kingdom, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) case relied upon by the Israeli Supreme
Court when it concluded that civilians directly participating in
hostilities could be killed only if capture, arrest, and trial were
210
not feasible. In McCann, the Court applied Article 2 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which provides strict
criteria for when the right to life can be infringed, and noticea211
bly fails to exclude armed conflict from its provisions. Article
2, Section 1 starts by proscribing that “[n]o one shall be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which
this penalty is provided by law,” thus carving out capital pun212
ishment from the article’s scope. Section 2 then goes on to
catalog areas where a killing is not considered a violation of
Section 1, including self-defense and defense of others (legitimate defense); lawful arrest or preventing escape from custody;
213
and lawfully quelling riots and insurrection. There is no mention of the privilege of combatancy in armed conflict against
214
lawful targets.
Most importantly, these three categories (defense, arrest,
215
and riots) are only excluded if absolutely necessary. Not only
is the concept of absolute necessity much more demanding than
the concept of military necessity, as will be explained below,
208. See, e.g., Schabas, supra note 199, at 593–94. In a sense, this is the
mirror image of the anxiety that IHL lawyers have regarding the importation
of human-rights law into their discipline, which will unravel the carefully
structured deal that yields success in IHL. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Concluding Remarks: LOAC and Attempts to Abuse or Subvert It, 87 INT’L L. STUD.
483, 488 (2011) (“[O]ften today we encounter the unpleasant phenomenon of
human rights-niks who, hoisting the banner of human rights law, are attempting to bring about a hostile takeover of LOAC.”). The institutional conflict between human rights and military lawyers is explored in Luban, supra note 92,
at 4. Luban notes that though Dinstein’s rhetoric is “exaggerated and unusually belligerent,” the phenomenon he describes is real. Id.
209. Milanović, supra note 111, at 98.
210. See McCann v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 97 (1995).
211. Id. ¶ 150.
212. ICCPR, supra note 188, art. 2(1).
213. Id. art. 2(2).
214. Id.
215. See McCann, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 149.
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but the ECHR concluded that absolute necessity is a far more
demanding legal test than the notion of “necessary in a democratic society,” which governs many other rights provisions in
216
the ECHR. Moreover, the court noted that a domestic UK inquest after the killings examined their lawfulness under the
standards of “reasonable force” and “reasonable necessity,” both
of which were incapable of expressing the highest form of exi217
gency required by absolute necessity. The court concluded
that, although the actions of the individual soldiers did not violate the absolute necessity standard, the planning of the operation by commanders, and other actions by government officials,
218
did violate the standard.
The standard therefore requires
that the underlying situation left the government with no other
alternative than the use of lethal force, a standard that goes
219
well beyond the more familiar test of reasonableness.
This notion of absolute necessity must be contrasted with
the concept of military necessity, both as it was first formulated
by Lieber and its more modern formulations. Recall first that
Lieber defined it as “measures which are indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to
the modern law and usages of war,” and concluded that neces216. See id.
217. This is arguably similar to the U.S. standard of reasonableness governing domestic law enforcement cases. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372,
376 (2007); Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11–12 (1985); Plakas v.
Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1149 (7th Cir. 1994). For a criticism of the standard,
see George M. Dery III, The Needless “Slosh” Through the “Morass of Reasonableness”: The Supreme Court’s Usurption of Fact Finding Powers in Assessing
Reasonable Force in Scott v. Harris, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 417, 436–48
(2008). But see Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of
Certainty and Detention of Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365,
1413 (2008) (supporting reasonableness as the operative principle governing
targeting in international law).
218. See McCann, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 213 (1995). (“In sum, having regard to
the decision not to prevent the suspects from travelling into Gibraltar, to the
failure of the authorities to make sufficient allowances for the possibility that
their intelligence assessments might, in some respects at least, be erroneous
and to the automatic recourse to lethal force when the soldiers opened fire, the
Court is not persuaded that the killing of the three terrorists constituted the
use of force which was no more than absolutely necessary in defence of persons
from unlawful violence within the meaning of Article 2(2)(a) of the Convention.”).
219. This is also sometimes referred to as the “least-harmful-means” or
“least restrictive means” test. See Blum, supra note 122, at 120; see also
Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and Regime
Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 355, 385 (2012) (arguing that transplanting
least-restrictive means test from constitutional law to IHL is not advisable).
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sity “admits of all direct destruction of life or limb of armed enemies” but outlawed cruelty, “the infliction of suffering for the
sake of suffering or for revenge,” as well as anything that, like
220
perfidy, “makes the return to peace unnecessarily difficult.”
In the more modern ICRC formulation—influential though not
binding—military necessity allows actions “required in order to
achieve the legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial submission of the enemy at the earliest possible
moment with the minimum expenditure of life and resources,”
and disclaims attacks that are not “actually necessary for the
221
accomplishment of legitimate military purposes.” Although
actual necessity may sound like stringent criteria—and tonally
similar to absolute necessity—in fact the far more relevant element is the ends for which the action must be necessary. Unlike in human-rights law, where the action must be absolutely
necessary to save the life of another, here the action need only
be actually necessary for the accomplishment of the conflict,
which includes defeating the enemy as quickly as possible with
222
the fewest risks to one’s own personnel. It is precisely for this
reason that the destruction of the enemy’s “life or limb” is con223
sistent with this standard.
So the two notions of necessity, though closely related, are
far from compatible, leading to the anxiety of watering down
human-rights law. As Milanović puts the point, “allowing the
state to kill combatants or insurgents under human rights law
without showing an absolute necessity to do so, or to detain
preventively during armed conflict, might lead to allowing the
state to do the same outside armed conflict, with one precedent
224
leading to another, and the another, and yet another.”
220. Lieber Code, supra note 14, art. 14–16.
221. See, e.g., INT’L AND OPERATIONAL LAW DEP’T, U.S. ARMY, LAW OF WAR
DESKBOOK 8 (2011); MELZER, supra note 105 at 78–79; U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 3 (July 1956); UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY
OF DEFENCE, supra note 117, § 2.4.
222. See Lazar, supra note 153, at 43 (“The problem is essentially that
identiﬁed in 57(2.a.ii): minimizing risks to civilians often involves imposing
additional risks on friendly combatants.”).
223. But see MARCO SASSÒLI, ANTOINE A. BOUVIER & ANNE QUINTIN, HOW
DOES LAW PROTECT IN WAR?: CASES, DOCUMENTS, AND TEACHING MATERIALS
ON CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1–2
n.16, (3d ed. 2011), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/
publications/icrc-0739-part-i.pdf (stating on the one hand that “[i]n order to
‘win the war’ it is not necessary to kill all enemy soldiers; it is sufﬁcient to capture them or to make them otherwise surrender” but on the other hand, conceding that IHL “does not prohibit the use of violence”).
224. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 97.
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Milanović argues that lex specialis is a rule of conflict avoidance rather the conflict resolution, so that if one could make
IHL and IHRL simpatico with each other, one ought to do so
rather than viewing IHL as taking precedence when its rules
225
conflict with IHRL. Regardless of whether this is plausible as
a general matter, the fact remains that on standards of necessity in the realm of targeting, IHL and IHRL do conflict, and no
amount of interpretation can square the circle. As Milanović
concedes, “It is questionable . . . whether this necessity requirement could be effectively applied in a more traditional
battlefield setting” and “[t]here is perhaps no other area of potential conflict where the infusion of IHLR with IHL could lead
to a greater slide into utopia, with a consequent slide into irrel226
evance.”
Second, there are other ways to go about solving the alleged codification gap sparked by the paucity of rules governing
NIACs. Importing the rules of IHRL is one solution, but one
might also apply the rules from IAC, either on the basis of
analogy or because these rules have become customary in
227
NIACs as well. Whether applied by analogy or custom, there
are strong prudential reasons to import rules from within IHL
228
rather than look outside to another body of law to fill the gap.
The rules of IHL applicable in IACs are, at the very least, engineered to deal with the very particular situation of warfare.
Moreover, IHL as a field is moving in a direction whereby the
rules of warfare are becoming insensitive to the distinction be225. The warrant for this position is that no treaty expressly gives IHL this
power over human-rights law. See id. at 115. But cf. Draper, supra note 204
(finding that IHL as lex specialis is implicitly incorporated by human-rights
provisions recognizing state parties’ power to “derogate” from the right to life).
226. See Milanović, supra note 111, at 121. Presumably, this leaves open
the possibility of using co-application in cases away from the traditional battlefield. However, it is unclear if the analysis can be segmented in this fashion.
If the two forms of necessity are inconsistent, why should they be co-applied in
cases on the traditional battlefield either?
227. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 128–35 (Oct. 2,
1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm (applying rules of IAC on the basis of customary law); see also Abresch, supra
note 200, at 742 (noting three methods, including analogy and custom, that
international lawyers have used to borrow the rules from IAC to apply them to
NIAC); Christopher Greenwood, International Humanitarian Law and the
Tadić Case, 7 EUR. J. INT’L L. 265, 280 (1996).
228. For a list of customary rules applicable in NIAC, see generally CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts &
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (outlining 161 rules related to IHL).
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tween IAC and NIAC; the rules of the former are gradually be229
ing adopted to apply to the latter. This is a preferable solution especially since essential building blocks like the principle
of necessity mean different things in IHL and IHRL (as Part
II.B explained), but at least the principle of necessity means
the same thing in IAC as NIAC and its borrowing between
them will not be subject to the same failures of translation.
Third, the rules of IHL, from Geneva to Hague Conventions, were already designed with the purpose of protecting in230
nocent civilians and their rights. The central building blocks
of IHL—the principles of necessity, proportionality, distinction,
and humanity—were designed so as to balance the interests of
the relevant parties and achieve a humanizing result that reduced the amount of suffering caused by armed conflicts. The
importation of IHRL rules, designed to protect rights during
peacetime, upsets the carefully calibrated rules that were de231
signed to do the same thing during armed conflict. That is the
232
reason why IHL is considered a lex specialis. In fact, the humanizing rules of IHL are designed to achieve practical results
because they consider their compliance and self-enforcement as
well as their normative pull. Throughout the whole field—
including notions of tu quoque and reprisals—the field has explicitly grappled with how to impose normative restraints on
the conduct of warfare even in the absence of a global sovereign
233
to demand compliance. At least one example is the immediate
229. Tadić Defence Motion, ¶ 126; Review of Indictment, Prosecutor v.
Martic, ICTY Trial Chamber, 8 Mar. 1996, ¶ 11; see also KNUT DÖRMANN ET
AL., ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 444 (2003) (discussing the ICTY’s application of rules
to internal armed conflicts); John Cerone, Jurisdiction and Power: The Intersection of Human Rights Law & The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict
in an Extraterritorial Context, 40 ISR. L. REV. 398, 398 (2007) (substantial convergence between rules of IAC and NIAC); Milanović & Hadzi-Vidanovic, supra note 25, at 1.
230. See SOLIS, supra note 135, at 23 (“Like its fraternal twin, LOAC, IHL
refers to the body of treaty-based and customary international law aimed at
protecting the individual in time of international or non-international armed
conflict.”); Blum, supra note 122, at 127 (stating that the animating principle
of IHL is the “sparing of all those who do not partake in hostilities”).
231. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 122, at 120 (“The obvious advantage of the
existing paradigm has been its purportedly straightforward applicability to
the battleﬁeld: In reliance on a status-based rule of distinction, soldiers need
not engage in a costly and dangerous process of ascertaining the merits of each
individual target.”).
232. See Parks, supra note 132, at 797–98.
233. See, e.g., ROBERT E. SCOTT & PAUL B. STEPHAN, THE LIMITS OF LEVIATHAN 33–35 (2006) (discussing prisoner’s dilemma problems in international
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notion that the rules of armed conflict are bilateral and apply
to both sides of the conflict; the collapse of IHL as a normative
regime will harm one’s own soldiers as well, thus giving each
side of the conflict some self-interested reasons to comply with
234
its prohibitions.
Fourth, and finally, the co-application of IHRL and IHL
is problematic because the two legal regimes govern two differ235
ent relationships. IHL is based on reciprocity, on co-equal belligerents meeting each other on the battlefield, each one subject
236
to the same rules as the other. Although the belligerents may
not be equal in military strength, their equality as a formal
matter is undeniable under the law of war, because the concept
of reciprocity governs their relationship. That said, IHRL is
based on a completely different relationship between the sovereign and her subject. As a body of law, IHRL constrains how a
government treats its own citizens (and other non-citizen sub237
jects) internally. These rules do not reciprocally apply against
the citizen in his or her dealing with the sovereign; this would
be a category mistake. To the extent that there is any reciprocity at all it is completely different: each sovereign reciprocally
promises to other sovereigns to treat his own subjects (not just
foreign nationals) in accordance with certain codified standards
238
of human rights. But it is important to distinguish between,
on the one hand, the source of the promise (reciprocally bilateral or multilateral at the level of sovereigns) and on the other
hand, the object of the regulation in question, which is the sovereign’s internal treatment of her subjects as constrained by
IHRL.
This distinction—between the government acting as a sovereign and the government acting as a belligerent—will be crulaw).
234. See generally Eyal Benvenisti, Customary International Law as a Judicial Tool for Promoting Efficiency, in THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 85 (Eyal Benvenisti & Moshe Hirsch eds.,
2004); Jens David Ohlin, Nash Equilibrium And International Law, 96
CORNELL L. REV. 869, 880–90 (2011) (finding the source of international legal
obligations in self-interested contractarianism).
235. See Schabas, supra note 199, at 607 (stating that these legal regimes
are incompatible because human-rights law’s “fundamental concern is not
with ﬁnding a fair and balanced approach to a conﬂict between two combatant
parties but rather with regulating the essentially unequal relationship between state and individual”).
236. SOLIS, supra note 135, at 9–10.
237. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 13–14 (1996).
238. Id.
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cial for the third and final part of this essay, which examines in
more detail the possibility of a domestic constitutional overlay
where the targeting of citizens is concerned. To that task we
now turn.
III. ACTING AS A SOVEREIGN VS. ACTING AS A
BELLIGERENT
Having failed to find that IHRL must govern—or partly
govern—combat situations, we now turn to the final legal avenue that might ground a duty to capture in cases of targeted
killings. In situations where the target is an American citizen,
such as Anwar al-Awlaki, there is at least a colorable legal argument that the U.S. Constitution imposes additional requirements that surpass the applicable standards in cases where
239
noncitizens are targeted. Although the U.S. Constitution does
not include a codified right to life—as the European Convention
and many European domestic constitutions do—it does include
240
the right to due process. The due-process rights afforded to
U.S. citizens might provide a constitutional overlay that requires something more than summary killing—say an opportunity to contest one’s status as a targeted individual or, at the
very least, the opportunity to be captured and arrested and
subject to the judicial process prior to the executive branch’s
241
last resort of summary killing by drone warfare.
239. Before the Obama administration launched its fatal drone strike
against al-Awlaki, the Justice Department’s Office of Legal Counsel reportedly
drafted memoranda to the Attorney General concluding that such a strike
would be lawful. The memoranda have not been publicly released but a summary document was leaked in February 2012. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A
SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADERS OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE
(2011), [hereinafter DOJ White Paper] available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
eprint/doj-lethal.pdf. The analysis in the white paper suggests that the U.S.
Constitution imposes additional constraints on the government’s actions, and
that the strike was permissible if capture was deemed unfeasible. See also Peter Finn, In Secret Memo, Justice Department Sanctioned Strike, WASH. POST,
Oct. 1, 2011, at A9; Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill
a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2011, at A1; see also First Amendment Coal. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2012 WL 3027460, at *3–*4 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2012) (litigation seeking release of memorandum).
240. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
241. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 35 (D.D.C. 2010) (suit alleging deprivation of Fifth Amendment right not to be deprived of law without
due process of law dismissed because father lacked standing). In a controversial holding, the court concluded that the father lacked standing because alAulaqi “can access the U.S. judicial system by presenting himself in a peaceful
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A. CAPTURE AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT
However, the precedents underlying a constitutional duty
to capture provide less guidance than one might hope because
they set the standard for the use of lethal force by law enforcement personnel in domestic police operations. Tennessee v.
Garner announced the modern Fourth Amendment standard
that allows the police to use lethal force, instead of arrest, only
when the police reasonably believe that such force is necessary
to stop the fleeing felon whose conduct poses an immediate
242
threat to the officer or others. Garner rightly rejected—as a
crude and ineffective proxy—the old common-law rule that
prohibited deadly force against fleeing misdemeanants but allowed it for all felons, regardless of the level of danger they
243
posed to the officer or the public. Major Supreme Court cases
244
applying Garner to different facts, such as Scott v. Harris, all
take place within the domestic context; none of them involve
operations conducted by the U.S. military or the CIA or implicate the relationship between the domestic constitutional
245
norms and the requirements of IHL.
Nor do the other standard precedents on extraterritorial
application of the Constitution shed any light on the issue or
represent facts even remotely similar to targeting situations.
246
Reid v. Covert, a standard citation for the proposition that
247
the Constitution follows the flag, involved a murder commitmanner . . . the same choice presented to all U.S. citizens.” Id. at 18. In essence, the court placed the duty on the target to surrender if he wanted to
trigger the judicial process, rather than place the duty on the government.
242. See 471 U.S. 1, 2 (1985); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at
9 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment requires balancing individual and
governmental interests).
243. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 11–12.
244. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 383–84 (2007) (applying the Garner
formulation to car chases); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 9
(noting that Fourth Amendment test is “situation-dependent”).
245. In fact, the Justice Department white paper concludes that “there exists no appropriate judicial forum to evaluate these constitutional considerations.” See DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 10. Although the white paper
appears to concede that these constitutional considerations are applicable extraterritorially, it is possible that the analysis was designed as an alternative
argument designed to win the day assuming arguendo that the Fourth of Fifth
Amendments applied. Id. at 5 (“The Department assumes that the rights afforded by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as well as the Fourth
Amendment, attach to a U.S. citizen even while he is abroad.”).
246. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
247. See RAUSTIALA, supra note 18, at 150 (noting one theory out of Reid
was “that the Constitution applied to the United States government wherever
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ted on a U.S. military installation overseas—an environment
248
where the federal government was already exercising control.
The holding simply asserted that no treaty or executive agreement could allow the Federal Government to circumvent the
249
Bill of Rights. The Insular Cases involved even more control
than was exercised in Reid v. Covert, since the territories in
question were governed by the Federal Government, though
250
not incorporated as states. Boumediene v. Bush applied the
Constitution “extraterritorially,” but only in a very weak sense
since the Court concluded that the federal government had de
251
facto control over Guantanamo Bay. In cases where the United States had little or no territorial control, the decisions go in
252
the opposite direction. One might rely on Justice Harlan’s
famous concurring dictum in Reid v. Covert that the Fifth
Amendment did not always apply to Americans overseas when
it would be anomalous and impracticable, which some commentators might seize upon as a hinge to suggest that constitutionally protected targeting decisions during war would be analo253
gous and impracticable. But one need not rely on or appeal to
such pragmatics. The simpler answer is that all of the precedents applying the Constitution extraterritorially have taken
place outside of armed conflict, or in situations in which the
United States exercised control verging on jurisdiction, or in
scenarios involving detention but not targeting (detention necessarily implying some level of territorial control).
However, an entire line of cases analyzing the due process
rights of Americans during armed conflict might prove more
and whenever it acted”).
248. Reid, 354 U.S. at 3.
249. Id. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution
provide to protect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because
he happens to be in another land.”); see RAUSTIALA, supra note 18, at 141–50.
250. The Insular Cases are a series of Supreme Court decisions which addressed the legal status of newly-acquired U.S. overseas territories. Id. at 80.
They include Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922); Dorr v. United States,
195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
251. 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008); see Anthony J. Colangelo, “De Facto Sovereignty”: Boumediene and Beyond, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 623, 625 (2009); see
also United States v. Tiede, 86 F.R.D. 227, 244 (U.S. Ct. Berlin 1979) (extending the right to a jury trial to civilians charged with non-military offenses in
U.S.-occupied Berlin).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990)
(denying extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment).
253. Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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promising. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court concluded that
under the Due Process Clause a citizen-belligerent detained on
the battlefield was entitled to contest his detention before a
254
neutral decision maker; the Bush administration responded
by creating the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to
255
satisfy the holding. Might the same reasoning apply in targeting cases? In other words, if the Due Process Clause requires the opportunity the contest one’s detention before a neutral decision maker, then surely being targeted for summary
killing—a far worse fate—must trigger, at a minimum, the
same level of due process, or perhaps an even greater level of
256
scrutiny. It would produce a system of perverse incentives if
one could short-circuit the requirements of the Due Process
Clause by killing, rather than simply detaining, the citizen257
belligerent. Such an argument turns upside down the liberty
258
interest at stake in these cases.
The problem with this argument is that the Hamdi case
looked to the international (i.e., IHL) rules of detention to generate a gloss on the scope of Congress’s use-of-force authoriza259
tion to the executive branch. As far as detention goes, the relevant proscription in Geneva is the requirement articulated in
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention which provides:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong
to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [entitling them to
POW status], such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present
Convention until such time as their status has been determined by a
260
competent tribunal.

254. 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004).
255. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 734.
256. See, e.g., Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Due Process and
Targeted Killing of Terrorists, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 405, 409–10 (2009) (arguing that, under Boumediene, the executive branch has the due process obligation to develop fair and rational procedures for reviewing targeted killings, wherever they take place).
257. See Ido Rosenzweig & Yuval Shany, Supreme Court Rejects Tort Claim
Following Targeted Killing Operation, 37 TERRORISM & DEMOCRACY, Jan.
2012, available at http://en.idi.org.il/analysis/terrorism-and-democracy/issueno
-37/supreme-court-rejects-tort-claim-following-targeted-killing-operation/.
258. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 437 (“[T]he executive
branch has an obligation to use fair and reasonable procedures to control how
it goes about depriving people of life, liberty, or property anywhere in the
world.”).
259. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520–21.
260. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 37, art. 5, 75 U.N.T.S. at 140–
42.
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So, in a sense, the foundation for the Constitution’s requirement that Hamdi and other citizen belligerents were entitled to contest their determination turned out to be a function
261
of pre-existing IHL requirements.
None of this suggests that Hamdi cannot serve as a prece262
dent for a duty to capture in targeting cases. But rather, two
things are apparent about Hamdi. First, it does not do much to
establish a domestic constitutional overlay that would change
or alter the analysis in any way, since much of the content of
the analysis in Hamdi curls back around and relies on the rele263
vant rules of IHL. So when transposed to the realm of targeting, one cannot use Hamdi as an anchor for an argument that
the Constitution requires something in addition to what IHL
already requires. Rather, Hamdi arguably stands for the prop264
osition that the Constitution requires what IHL requires.
Although this might be thought to render the Due Process
Clause superfluous in these cases, it does limit the degree to
which the executive and legislative branches can depart from
the international requirements.
Second, Hamdi cannot stand for the proposition that the
Fifth Amendment requires an extra level of process for Ameri261. Ostensibly, O’Connor’s plurality opinion in Hamdi applied the “balancing of interests” due process analysis first articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. However, Hamdi’s
analysis of the scope of Congress’s authorization to the executive (including
detention) was “based on longstanding law-of-war principles.” Id. at 521.
262. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 440 (arguing that the
Hamdi/Boumediene model proposes subjecting targeted killings to a form of
judicial review in civil actions initiated by private parties, such as a Bivensstyle action); see also DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 6 (concluding that
a due process balancing test would find that the government need not provide
“further process” to a citizen belligerent if capture is infeasible and the “targeted individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack”).
263. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
264. But see Jenny S. Martinez, International Decision: Availability of U.S.
Courts to Review Decision to Hold U.S. Citizens as Enemy Combatant—
Executive Power in War on Terror, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 782, 785 (2004) (arguing
that Hamdi evidences an uncertain relationship between U.S. law and IHL);
David Weissbrodt & Nathaniel H. Nesbitt, The Role of the United States Supreme Court in Interpreting and Developing Humanitarian Law, 95 MINN. L.
REV. 1339, 1395 (2011) (“The complexities of humanitarian law are at the center of the plurality opinion’s lack of clarity.”). One possible interpretation of
Hamdi is that IHL law influenced the Court’s analysis of Congress’s grant of
power to the executive branch, as a matter of statutory interpretation of the
AUMF, but that the same IHL norms played no rule in the constitutional
analysis of due process under the Mathews framework. See Murphy & Radsan,
supra note 256, at 424–25 (discussing how Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion
“straddled the civil liberties and executive supremacy camps”).
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can citizens. Although that was nominally what Hamdi stated,
this was simply because Hamdi himself was an American citizen and the Court was not confronted with the question of how
the Due Process Clause applied with regard to the detention of
non-citizens. When it came time to explain the reasons for its
holding in Hamdi, none of the Court’s reasons applied solely to
citizens; rather, in relying on basic principles of detention regulation under IHL, the Court was providing reasons that apply
to citizens and non-citizens. So although citizenship mattered
265
for the formal holding of Hamdi, citizenship did not matter
for the reasons relied upon in the Hamdi opinion.
When it came time to determine the rights of non-citizen
detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Boumediene v. Bush, the
Court reaffirmed the detainees’ constitutional right to habeas
corpus and the full effect of the Suspension Clause at Guan266
tanamo (which had not been satisfied). Since the habeas corpus rights vindicated in Boumediene were greater than those
asserted in Hamdi, it is clear that even the Court itself recognized that the Due Process Clause analysis in Hamdi had little
267
basis in citizenship. In a sense, the outcome in Boumediene
was written on the wall once Hamdi was decided and its decidedly non-citizen reasons for decision articulated.
So even under the Hamdi and Boumediene framework,
much of the constitutional analysis is arguably structured by
the question of whether IHL is triggered and what IHL pro268
vides. In the previous two Parts of this Article, I critically
considered several potential obstacles to the application of IHL,
265. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 523–24 (2004) (making clear that
the Court’s holding was tied to the facts of the case, i.e., the detention of an
American citizen captured on a foreign battlefield); see also DOJ White Paper,
supra note 239, at 6 (discussing “realities of combat” and the government’s
compelling interest).
266. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743 (2008) (concluding that
“[b]ecause the Constitution's separation-of-powers structure, like the substantive guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, protects persons as
well as citizens, foreign nationals who have the privilege of litigating in our
courts can seek to enforce separation-of-powers principles” (citations omitted)).
267. Id. at 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion
because “surely the Due Process Clause does not afford non-citizens in such
circumstances greater protection than citizens are due”).
268. Although Hamdi did not critically examine the question of whether
IHL was triggered by the conflict with al-Qaeda, the question was squarely
addressed in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630–31 (2006) (concluding
that an armed conflict “not of an international character” exists between the
United States and al-Qaeda, triggering the applicability of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions).
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including the alleged lack of an armed conflict with al-Qaeda or
the inability of al-Qaeda as an organization to qualify as a participant to an armed conflict. Part II critically examined the
possibility of co-applying IHRL and IHL together—a legal
strategy fraught with difficulty given the competing normative
frameworks of the two fields. That said, neither section offered
an overwhelmingly positive argument for which paradigm applied and whether IHL or IHRL should govern such attacks.
Furthermore, given the conclusions of Hamdi and Boumediene,
it is unlikely that a target’s status as an American citizen will
alter whether IHL or IHRL should apply.
However, the public’s common-sense intuitions about the
killing of American citizens, even if they play no formal role in
the analysis, are highly relevant for examining what is so trou269
bling about the al-Awlaki incident.
Does the government
have the power to order the summary killing of one of its citizens? In his speech at Northwestern Law School, Attorney
General Eric Holder argued that the requirements of the Due
Process Clause were satisfied by the internal deliberative process that the executive branch—involving personal decisions by
President Obama himself—undergoes before deciding to place
270
an individual on the target list (which in effect is a kill list).
Furthermore, Holder noted that an extra level of due process
271
analysis is triggered when the target is an American citizen.
269. See supra notes 3–16 and accompanying text.
270. Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., Address at Northwestern Law School (Mar.
15, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/agspeech-1203051.html (explaining the due process analysis conducted by the
executive branch prior to using lethal force against a target).
271. See id. (“[T]he government must take into account all relevant constitutional considerations with respect to United States citizens—even those who
are leading efforts to kill innocent Americans. Of these, the most relevant is
the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that the government
may not deprive a citizen of his or her life without due process of law.”). Holder also noted that the United States only targets citizens after determining
that capture is not feasible, though he left was vague as to whether the administration views this as a legal or prudential constraint:
Let me be clear: an operation using lethal force in a foreign country,
targeted against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al
Qaeda or associated forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to
kill Americans, would be lawful at least in the following circumstances: First, the U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and
careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; second, capture is not feasible;
and third, the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent
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The process involves no check on executive-branch discretion,
however, which is precisely what many consider to be at the
core of Due Process protections, though there are other examples of constitutional “process” that do not involve judicial272
branch determinations. Even so, this sovereign entitlement—
the killing of a citizen without judicial review—smacks of royal
prerogative and represents precisely the kind of unchecked
power that both human rights law and the domestic Due Pro273
cess Clause were designed to constrain. This intuition is legitimate and ought to be the basis for further analysis. It contains the seeds of a strong argument.
At issue in this intuition is the relationship between the
citizen and his government—a relationship that is trampled or
infringed when the government orders his or her summary killing. Indeed, there is something problematic going on when a
citizen is killed by his own government. Although there are
other examples—capital punishment being the most obvious—
these other examples usually involve prior judicial review. Although killing a terrorist as part of the armed conflict with alQaeda will always generate controversy, the killing of a terrorist by his own government inevitably raises eyebrows. Indeed,
the sovereignty of the government—its capacity to act—ought
to be at its lowest ebb when it engages in the killing of one of
its own subjects.
with applicable law of war principles.
Id. (emphasis added).
272. However, most of these examples involve neutral decision-makers,
such as Administrative Law Judges, situated within the executive branch. See
generally Mission, Constitution and Bylaws, FED. ADMIN. L. JUDGES CONF.,
http://www.faljc.org/mission-constitution-bylaws/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2013)
(describing the role of Administrative Law Judges in upholding the right to
due process). Indeed, the Hamdi-inspired CSRTs are precisely a case in point:
judicial-like proceedings performed within an Article II setting. See Memorandum from the Deputy Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts Enclosure 1 (July 14, 2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/news/Aug2006/
d20060809CSRTProcedures.pdf. In contrast, the executive determinations described by Holder in his Northwestern speech, supra note 270, are purely extrajudicial. These create the very asymmetry that provokes anxiety among the
citizenry: the administration provides greater due process protection for detainees, in the form of CSRTs and constitutionally guaranteed habeas corpus
proceedings in district courts, as compared with targeted killings, which are
subject only to internal executive branch deliberations without judicial involvement. The DOJ White Paper speaks of an “informed, high-level official” of
the Executive Branch who makes the determination regarding the target’s
threat. See DOJ White Paper, supra note 239, at 6.
273. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 256, at 408 (describing how human
rights law limits a state’s law enforcement operations).
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B. SOVEREIGNTY AND BELLIGERENCY
Given that the key issue here is the relationship between
the citizen-terrorist and his government, I wish to introduce a
central distinction in the government’s capacity to act: when
the government acts as a sovereign versus when the govern274
ment acts as a belligerent. The former mode is engaged when
the government treats its own subjects and internally regulates
275
the affairs of its country; the law enforcement paradigm is
276
part-and-parcel with the government acting as a sovereign,
though law enforcement is just one aspect of that relationship
277
between subject and sovereign. On the other hand, the government acts a belligerent when it is engaged in armed conflict
and meets another co-equal belligerent on the field of battle, a

274. This distinction is central to Professor Neff’s historical study of U.S.
legal regulation during the Civil War. See STEPHEN C. NEFF, JUSTICE IN BLUE
AND GRAY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL WAR 15–19 (2010) (describing the
different bodies of law that apply when a state is acting as a sovereign versus
when it is acting as a belligerent). For a discussion of Neff’s book, see Alan G.
Kaufman, Book Review: Justice in Blue and Gray: A Legal History of the Civil
War by Stephen C. Neff, LAWFARE (Mar. 7, 2012, 6:44 PM), http://www
.lawfareblog.com/2012/03/justice-in-blue-and-grey-a-legal-history-of-the-civil
-war/.
275. See also Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction
and What Jurisdiction Amounts to, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 857, 872 (2012) (concluding that jurisdiction, as a threshold criterion for applicability of human
rights, is based on effective power, overall control, and normative guidance).
276. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 15 (explaining that a government acting
in a sovereign capacity acts “as the enforcer of its own national laws”).
277. When I use the phrase “subject of a sovereign,” I mean to refer to all
individuals subject to the control and jurisdiction of a state’s government. This
usage departs from the more technical use of the term as a distinction between
subjects of a monarchy (such as England) and citizens of a republic (such as
the United States). See JOHN SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE 133 n.e (Glanville L.
Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947) (describing the traditional distinction between
citizens and subjects). Under this technical usage, subject and citizen are
roughly analogous, though the transition from one to the other may have profound political consequences as it did during the American Revolution. See id.
(“[T]he term citizen brings into prominence the rights and privileges of the
status . . . while the reverse is the case with the term subject.”). However, I
use the term here in the wider sense to denote the class of individuals, whether citizens or resident aliens, who are governed by a state. See id. (“[T]he term
subject is capable of a different and wider application, in which it includes all
members of the body politic, whether they are citizens (i.e., subjects stricto
sensu) or resident aliens. All such persons are subjects, all being subject to the
power of the state and to its jurisdiction, and as owing to it, at least temporarily, fidelity and obedience.”). BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1561 (9th ed. 2009)
(quoting SALAMOND, supra note 277, at 133).
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relationship inevitably structured by the principle of reciproci278
ty.
The key point here is that both modes of government—
acting as a sovereign and acting as a belligerent—are subject to
regulation by international law. The former mode is regulated
by international human-rights law because it involves a relationship of subjugation that can only be checked by international agreements that constrain how sovereigns treat their
279
own subjects. Such relationships are especially susceptible to
abuse, which is why the development of the post-World-War-II
280
human-rights movement was so significant.
The latter
mode—acting as a belligerent—is regulated by IHL because it
involves a relationship of co-equal belligerents who meet each
other on the battlefield, both hoping to destroy the other with
281
brute force tempered only by self-interested legal constraints.
Finding the dividing line between these two modes of ac282
tion is exceptionally difficult, especially in NIACs. In the case
of an IAC, most incidents of warfare involve the state acting as
a belligerent. At the other end of the spectrum, during moments of absolute peacetime, almost every action of the state is
action as a sovereign with regard to its subjects. However, since
NIACs often involve internal conflicts, it may be difficult to
know when an internal disturbance, riot, or insurrection has
283
ripened into a full-blown civil war. Prior to that ripening, the
278. See SOLIS, supra note 135, at 10 (“We obey the law of war if for no other reason than because reciprocity tells us that what goes around comes
around.”).
279. See Julia Dobtsis, Doctrinal Insights of the Goldstone Report 16 (Jan.
23, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (noting that, unlike
IHL, “international human rights law emerged as a supplement to the uneven
internal distribution of power between a government and its citizens”); see also
Yuval Shany, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law as Competing Legal
Paradigms for Fighting Terror, in INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, supra note 111, at 13, 14–22 (describing
the relationship between human rights law and the “law and order” paradigm
of international conflict).
280. See Dobtsis, supra note 279, at 17 (“[H]uman rights law protects individuals from all sorts of arbitrary behavior by their national government at
regional, national, and international levels.”).
281. See supra Part II.C.
282. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 28 (noting the ability of governments in
NIACs to exercise both sovereign and belligerent powers at the same time). Indeed, Neff considers this the essence of an asymmetrical conflict, because the
government has this luxury while the non-state forces do not. Id.
283. Id. at 18 (“[T]he two types of crisis do not, in practice, separate quite
so cleanly into the two categories just described.”).
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conflict involves the sovereign’s treatment of its own citizens
under its own control; at some point when control has utterly
evaporated the state meets even its own former subjects on the
battlefield as co-equal belligerents. In that moment, the state
acts as a belligerent under the laws of war even if its enemies
were once its subjects. At some point, if the state is victorious
in its military campaign, “acting as a belligerent” inevitably
ends and the state returns to acting as a sovereign again; IHRL
or the law of occupation as lex specialis is triggered (depending
284
on the nature of the conflict).
The relationship between the two modes is especially complex since, as historian Stephen Neff makes clear, the state
may act as sovereign and as belligerent at the same time, as
285
the United States did during the U.S. Civil War. In cases
where a state acts as a belligerent, this does not mean that all
actions conducted by the state fall under the belligerent mode;
this would be implausible. The regular affairs of the state, unconnected to its prosecution of the war effort, continue unabated and are best understood as acting as a sovereign with regard
to its subjects. One might even view the famous Youngstown
Steel edict that the President is commander-in-chief of the
armed forces—but not commander-in-chief of the nation—as an
286
expression of that reality. The existence of the armed conflict
does not turn the executive (and the federal government generally) into a military government with plenary authority over
287
every aspect of daily life.
How might this help answer the question of al-Awlaki’s
fate? The question is whether the government, in attempting to
kill him, was acting as a sovereign or acting as a belligerent. If
the state was acting as a sovereign, then the constraints of international human-rights law ought to apply, including its
higher requirements of necessity (such as the least-restrictive
means test), but if the state was acting as a belligerent, the
killing ought to be regulated by IHL, including the notion of
military necessity that allows the taking of life and limb of en284. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCU81–88 (2009).
285. NEFF, supra note 274, at 113–14 (using property confiscations as examples of how a government action may straddle the borderline between the
two categories).
286. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 643–44
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
287. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (“[A] state of
war is not a blank check.”).
PATION
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288

emy personnel. But how does one know whether the state is
acting as a sovereign or a belligerent; whether it is wielding its
sovereign power over its own subjects or whether it is meeting
its enemies on the battlefield as a co-equal belligerent? The
mere existence of the categories does not, by itself, entail an account that explains when each is applicable.
Furthermore, although the target’s identity as an American citizen may create a presumption that the relationship is
one of sovereign-subject, the target’s status as an American cit289
izen is not outcome-determinative. After all, Nazi soldiers
during World War II who happened to hold U.S. citizenship
were not entitled to any extra level of due process by virtue of
290
their status. The U.S. Army simply treated them—for purposes of targeting—just as it treated German nationals, subject
to killing in accordance with the traditional IHL principles of
military necessity and humanity; there was no extra duty to attempt capture of Americans fighting for the Nazi Army before
291
killing them. Similarly, all members of the Confederate Army
during the Civil War were presumptively American citizens,
since the Union did not recognize the legitimacy of the putative
292
Southern secession. Hence, Confederate soldiers were met on
the battlefield as enemy combatants, not subject to a duty to
capture but instead subject to the taking of “life and limb” in
293
accordance with Lieber’s notion of military necessity. If a duty to capture had applied, the Civil War would have been

288. See discussion supra Parts II.A.–B.
289. Indeed, arguments that rely on al-Awlaki’s citizenship alone to determine his legal relationship to his government simply beg the question, since
citizens are capable of standing in a belligerent stance with their own government; this is precisely what the war paradigm and IHL regulate.
290. One notable example is Martin Monti, an American pilot who defected
to Nazi Germany. See Michael W. Lewis, Potential Pitfalls of “Strategic Litigation”: How the al-Aulaqi Lawsuit Threatened to Undermine International Humanitarian Law, 9 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 177, 178 n.8 (2011). See generally
THOMAS J. MORROW, NEBRASKA DOPPELGANGER (2006) (detailing a historic
fictional account of American citizens of German ancestry who returned to
Germany to fight in World War II).
291. Id. at 177–78.
292. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 19–20.
293. See id. at 21 (“The Union therefore never wavered in its policy of
treating soldiers in the confederate armies as enemy belligerents rather than
as traitors.”). Not only was the Civil War fought in accordance with Lieber’s
notion of military necessity, it was the birth of the modern notion of necessity
that still governs IHL today. See id. at 61–62 (providing an illustrative example from the Civil War of modern military necessity).
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fought far differently; indeed, it would not have been a war at
294
all but rather a simple police action.
So if citizenship is not outcome-determinative, how do we
distinguish between the government’s action as a sovereign and
the government’s actions as a co-equal belligerent on the battlefield? The answer that I want to sketch out here is that a state
never meets an individual qua individual on the battlefield as a
co-equal belligerent, because belligerency between a state and
an individual is logically impossible. The whole structure of belligerency requires the existence of an adversary that is capable
of exercising the core elements of belligerency—not just engaging in an isolated hostile act—but rather engaging in a sustained conflict that triggers the relationship of belligerency between hostile powers.
Such belligerency is usually between collectives. The state
meets an individual on the battlefield as a co-equal belligerent
295
when the individual is acting qua member of a collective.
However, the relevant collective need not be a state; nothing
hinges on the enemy’s formal status as a recognized state meeting the standards necessary for conducting international rela296
tions. The enemy collective must simply be capable of exercising enough military operations such that the enemy stands in a
297
relationship of belligerency with the attacking state. To the
extent that the individual is a member of this enemy collective,
his relationship with the state is mediated by the belligerency
298
between his collective organization and the state.
In theory, a lone individual operating independently could
launch a devastating attack against the United States. Such an
individual would inevitably have great resources at his or her
disposal that could inflict great harm without the use of human
subordinates. (Once human subordinates are added to the mix,
the conflict is by definition between collectives again.) Although
such an attack would be devastating, it is unclear if the individual could be in a direct relationship of belligerency against a
state without being mediated through a larger organization.
294. See id. at 19.
295. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 27–28.
296. These standards are expressed in the Montevideo Convention. See
Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, 165
L.N.T.S. 19. A contrasting set of criteria was presented by the Badinter Commission. See THOMAS D. GRANT, THE RECOGNITION OF STATES 159 (1999).
297. ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 22.
298. Id.
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Indeed, the U. S. has taken great pains to argue that such “lone
wolfs” would not be subject to the law of armed conflict, and
299
with good reason. The law of armed conflict is a species of
public international law, which traditionally governs the rela300
tionship between collectives.
However, one might argue that the functional standard for
belligerency should be insensitive to the distinction between
individuals and collectives. The relevant standard for individual belligerency would be the same as collective belligerency: is
the individual capable of carrying out attacks and is the individual capable of following the laws of war if he is inclined to do
so? At the collective level, one asks whether the collective is organized in such a way as to meet this functional standard; at
the individual level, one simply asks about personal capability
rather than organization. However, we need not answer this
question to pursue the central argument of this Article. Individual belligerency is not likely to happen in real life and remains a hypothetical thought experiment; the more likely sce301
nario is collective belligerency.
As discussed in Part I.B, IHL already includes standards
for determining collective belligerency. According to the standard elucidated in Additional Protocol II, which is as good as
any, the group must be capable of exercising sustained military
operations and capable of reciprocating the key elements of the
302
Geneva Conventions. Although a linear hierarchy might be
one way of meeting these criteria, it is not a necessary condition. It is logically possible to be organized in different ways
and still carry out sustained military operations; the key re299. See Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel of the U.S. Dep’t of Def., The
Conflict Against Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates: How Will It End?, Speech at the
Oxford Union, Oxford University (Nov. 30, 2012), in Benjamin Wittes, Jeh
Johnson Speech at the Oxford Union, LAWFARE (Nov. 30, 2012, 12:01 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/
(“Nor does our enemy in this armed conflict include a ‘lone wolf’ who, inspired
by al Qaeda’s ideology, self-radicalizes in the basement of his own home, without ever actually becoming part of al Qaeda. Such persons are dangerous, but
are a matter for civilian law enforcement, not the military, because they are
not part of the enemy force.”).
300. Orla Marie Buckley, Note & Comment, Unregulated Armed Conflict:
Non-State Armed Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Violence in
Western Sahara, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 793, 810–12 (2012) (providing
a brief overview of the progression of recognized actors in international law).
301. See William A. Schabas, Prosecuting Dr Strangelove, Goldfinger, and
the Joker at the International Criminal Court: Closing the Loopholes, 23
LEIDEN J.INT’L L. 847, 847–49 (2010).
302. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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quirement is the level of organization and whether it meets the
functional standard of being capable of supporting ongoing at303
tacks against the state.
The government’s capacity to act as a belligerent would not
follow back to within its territorial jurisdiction, thus explaining
why the government may not use a targeted killing or drone
strike to kill a suspected terrorist, absent exigency, residing in
the United States. In these situations, the United States has
complete control over the subject by virtue of its exclusive jurisdiction of the underlying territory, thus triggering the legal
architecture of human rights as a constraint on governmental
304
action. In limited situations this distinction might evaporate
if an armed conflict within the territory of the United States
eviscerates or substantially degrades the government’s control
305
over its subjects. In all other situations, though, the government’s control over its own territory triggers the application of
the subject-sovereign relationship, even when combatants may
306
occasionally appear within that territory.
1. The Objection from Status
This account produces one surprising result: the animating
principle that governs the result is based on the individual’s
status as a member of an enemy collective. Although this concentration on status might prove disconcerting to civil libertarians who believe that an individual’s conduct alone ought to
govern the analysis, there are central insights that ought to be
307
kept in mind. First, the distinction between status and con308
duct is partly illusory, or at the very least exaggerated. In
this case, the individual only becomes a member of an enemy

303. See, e.g., Jean-Philippe Kot, Israeli Civilians Versus Palestinian Combatants? Reading the Goldstone Report in Light of the Israeli Conception of the
Principle of Distinction, 24 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 961, 985 (2011) (“The concept of
organized armed group refers to non-state armed forces in a strictly functional
sense.”).
304. See supra text accompanying note 239.
305. See NEFF, supra note 274, at 20–22 (detailing the blurred distinction
between the federal government as sovereign and belligerent in the Civil
War).
306. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
307. For a discussion of this surprising result and a full normative defense
of its application, see Jens David Ohlin, Targeting Co-Belligerents, in TARGETED KILLINGS: LAW AND MORALITY IN AN ASYMMETRICAL WORLD, supra note
172, at 60, 79–80.
308. See id. at 87.
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309

collective by virtue of his prior actions. Second, IHL is already based on status targeting in the sense that enemy soldiers are targetable based on their status as members of an en310
emy army. What this account does, then, is simply recognize
the importance of the collective organization and how its existence transforms the individual qua individual into an individual qua member. That transformation is central to the outcome
of the analysis, because essentially only collectives (and their
members) are capable of standing in a relationship of belliger311
ency with the state.
As a final point, it is often said that IHL targeting can be
based on either status or conduct. Status targeting, as just
mentioned, includes targeting based on the individual’s status
as a member of a regular army or, in a slightly more contentious standard, as a member of a non-state actor who has a con312
tinuous combat function within that organization. However,
it is also the case that individuals who are directly participating in hostilities may also be targeted under IHL, and this is
313
often described as conduct-based targeting.
While directly
participating in hostilities is far more conduct-oriented, it is not
wholly without status. The notion of directly participating in
hostilities presumes that there is already a state of hostility between two warring collectives, and the individual in question
joins one side of the conflict by directly contributing to its
cause. The notion of membership is replaced by the notion of
contribution or participation, but all of them involve the individual’s relationship to the collective effort. And the state’s belligerency is always maintained at the collective level.
2. Is the Collective Organization Military in Nature?
A second objection remains. Since membership in the warring collective is key for determining whether the state is acting as a belligerent in its interactions with the individual, it is
314
imperative to provide an account of membership.
Formal
membership, including employment by a national department
of defense, might be appropriate for national armies, but mem309. Id. at 86.
310. Id. at 78.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 295–301.
312. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 20 n.33.
313. Id. at 20.
314. See MELZER, supra note 105, at 350–52; Van Schaack, supra note 11,
at 291 n.244 (discussing “combatants” within non-state armed groups).
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bership in a non-state organization requires more functional
315
criteria. Although there are many factual elements that could
do the trick, the most plausible criterion is placement in a
316
command structure in the form of giving or taking of orders.
This ensures that the individual stands in a roughly analogous
position as a regular combatant in more traditional armed forces. The conclusion of this argument is that all members of both
the state’s armed forces and the non-state actor are by defini317
tion combatants and can be targeted. Functional membership
imposes a level of symmetry to an otherwise asymmetrical conflict, by emphasizing the reciprocal relationship of the collectives as co-equal belligerents whose actions towards each other
318
are governed by IHL.
But this argument relies on the force of an analogy, i.e.,
that the non-state organization is a military organization,
319
analogous to the armed forces of a state. This may or may not
be the case, depending on whether the non-state organization
exercises civilian functions or not. In other words, if the nonstate organization is military through-and-through, then mem315. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 25 (discussing
functional combatancy).
316. See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 2010)
(applying functional criteria for membership based on presence and movement
on the battlefield with an organization-affiliated brigade and carrying a brigade-issued weapon); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, 75 (D.D.C. 2009)
(“The key inquiry, then, is . . . whether the individual functions or participates
within or under the command structure of the organization—i.e., whether he
receives and executes orders or directions.”).
317. The warrant for this position is that all members of the armed forces
have received basic training and are therefore capable of firing a weapon, even
if their primary assignment is not a combat assignment. See ICRC INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 113, at 34 (“An individual recruited, trained and
equipped by such a group to continuously and directly participate in hostilities
on its behalf can be considered to assume a continuous combat function even
before he or she first carries out a hostile act.”). Blum notes that a more restricted definition of combatant (so as not to include all members of armed
forces) was explicitly rejected during the negotiations of API. See Blum, supra
note 122, at 129 (citing CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., ICRC, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12
AUGUST 1949, at 515 (1987)).
318. See supra text accompanying note 237.
319. The issue is discussed in Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 73–74 (citing
Additional Protocol II, supra note 40, art. 13, 1125 U.N.T.S. at 615); Prosecutor v. Galić, Case No. IT-98-29-T, Judgment and Opinion, ¶ 47 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 5, 2003); Prosecutor v. Blaski, Case No.
IT-95-14-T, Judgment, ¶ 180 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar.
3, 2000) (allowing detention of all members of al-Qaeda and Taliban as consistent with IHL based on membership in non-state armed groups).
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bership necessary places the individual in a position of belligerency with the state. However, if the non-state organization is
composed of military and civilian divisions, membership alone
in the umbrella organization is insufficient to demonstrate the
320
individual’s status as a targetable belligerent. In these situations, the individual might be a member of the civilian division
of the organization. In such situations, the government must
demonstrate either that the individual is a member of the military “wing” of the organization or that the organization is exclusively military in nature and has no civilian (i.e., nonmilitary) functions. Whether al-Qaeda, or any of its predicates
(including al-Qaeda “core,” al-Shabab, and AQAP) are military
organizations or dual civilian-military organizations is a factual question beyond the scope of this Article. However, a factual
conclusion that al-Qaeda is a dual-use organization would
demonstrate that membership alone in al-Qaeda is insufficient
to place an individual in a position of belligerency with the
state and hence insufficient to trigger the permissive targeting
321
rules of IHL, including its principle of military necessity.

320. See Hamlily, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 74–75; see also Robert Chesney &
Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (2008) (identifying examples of
civilian components of armed forces).
321. Members of the Obama administration have publicly stated that the
United States does not target individuals simply based on membership alone
and that a higher threshold is required. See John O. Brennan, Assistant to the
President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, The Ethics and Efficacy of
the President’s Counterterrorism Strategy, Address at the Woodrow Wilson
Center, Washington, D.C. (Apr. 30, 2012), in International Security Studies,
WILSON CENTER, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/event/the-efficacy-and-ethics-us
-counterterrorism-strategy (last visited Jan. 23, 2013) (“Even if it is lawful to
pursue a specific member of al-Qaida, we ask ourselves whether that individual’s activities rise to a certain threshold for action, and whether taking action
will, in fact, enhance our security. For example, when considering lethal force
we ask ourselves whether the individual poses a significant threat to U.S. interests.”). Brennan’s speech implied that the U.S. view is that it is lawful to
target based on membership in al-Qaeda but that the Administration as a
prudential matter only targets individuals who pose a direct threat to the
United States and its interests. The recent strategic development of so-called
“signature strikes,” if factually correct, cast some doubt on the veracity of this
prudential rule. Signature strikes target individuals whose exact identity remains elusive but are present at known terrorist locations—such as training
camps or hideouts—a strategy which bears a striking similarity to membership-based targeting. See Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a
Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, at A1.
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CONCLUSION
The duty to capture rests at the fault line between IHRL
and IHL. The core protection of IHRL is the right to life; the
core privilege of IHL is combatancy, the right to kill with impunity. Although this formulation throws the normative tension of the two bodies of law into sharp relief, the gulf is inevitable and inescapable. The duty to capture applies in the
former body of law but not the latter. Straddling these bodies of
law is the ever-present concept of necessity. But the preceding
analysis has argued that a unified notion of necessity that extends across domains is over-ambitious and inevitably risks
covertly importing the norms of one body of law across the divide into the other body of law. Necessity in human rights
means that the government, when acting as sovereign with regards to its subjects, must pursue the least restrictive means of
securing its interests when doing so involves a deprivation of
the rights of its subjects. In such situations, the duty to attempt capture, if feasible, applies. In contrast, necessity in IHL
means that the government meets its enemies as a co-equal
belligerent and destroys “life and limb” in order to secure the
aims of the war (victory) with the fewest possible casualties to
its troops. In such situations, the duty to capture fades away,
replaced by the privilege of belligerency and the core principles
that find their purest expression in the concept of military necessity.

